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This dissertation estimates the impact of the Federal Reserves 2008 - 2011 quan-
titative easing (QE) program on the U.S. term structure of interest rates and
USD/JPY exchange rate. We estimate an arbitrage-free term structure model
that explicitly includes the quantity impact of the Feds trades on Treasury mar-
ket prices. As such, we are able to estimate both the magnitude and duration of
the QE price e¤ects. We show that the Feds QE program a¤ected forward rates
without introducing arbitrage opportunities into the Treasury security markets.
Short- to medium- term forward rates were reduced (less than twelve years), but
the QE had little if any impact on long-term forward rates. This is in contrast to
the Feds stated intentions for the QE program. We also extend the framework to
analyze the e¤ect of the Feds QE program on the USD/JPY exchange rate. We
nd that the Feds QE accounts for a signicant portion of the depreciation of the
dollar during this period. A central monetary authority can a¤ect exchange rates
directly by intervening in foreign exchange markets, or indirectly by a¤ecting in-
terest rates. The analysis emphasizes the importance of the latter indirect channel,
especially in a period when a central bank undertakes massive bond purchasing
activities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Following the 2007-2009 nancial crisis, many central banks around the globe
conducted an unconventional monetary policy tool, known as quantitative easing
(QE). It is a bond market intervention where a central bank purchases very large
volume of bond securities. The purpose of QE is to lower interest rates and to
boost prices of risky assets, which might be benecial for the economic recovery.
In particular, between November 2008 and March 2010 the Federal Reserve
conducted massive asset purchases known as the rst round of quantitative eas-
ing (QE1) to lower long-term interest rates and spur economic growth. In QE1
the Fed purchased approximately $1.75 trillion of assets consisting of $1.25 trillion
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), $300 billion Treasury securities, and $200 bil-
lion federal agency debt. Between November 2010 and June 2011, another phase
of quantitative easing known as QE2 was implemented, consisting of an additional
purchase of $600 billion long-term Treasuries. Because of the size of the asset
purchases, the Feds QE has important impacts in various asset markets.
One important question is whether QE was successful at lowering interest rates
given a federal funds rate (Figure 1.1) that has been almost zero since the end of
2008.1 And if e¤ective, which Treasury rates were lowered, by how much, and for
how long?
Another notable phenomenon is that the U.S. dollar has depreciated signi-
cantly against the Japanese yen during the QE periods (Figure 1.2). One may
wonder whether there is any relation between the Feds QE and the dollar depre-
1See Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) for a discussion of monetary policies around the zero lower
bound for short-term interest rates.
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Figure 1.1: Time-series of Federal Funds Rate
ciation. If yes, how do we quantify this QE e¤ect on the dollar value?
This dissertation tries to address the above questions. It proposes a frame-
work to quantify the QE impact on both the interest rate market and the foreign
exchange market.
The outline for the rest of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 studies
the QE impact on the whole term structure of U.S. Treasury rates. Chapter
3 examines the QE impact on the dollar/yen exchange rate. The conclusion is
provided in Chapter 4.
2
Figure 1.2: Time-series of dollar/yen exchange rate
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING ON THE TERM
STRUCTURE OF U.S. TREASURY RATES
During the rst and second round of quantitative easing (QE), the Federal
Reserve purchased a huge volume of mortgage-backed securities and Treasury se-
curities (see Chapter 1). Since it is a bond market intervention, one may wonder
how much impact it has on interest rates.
The existing empirical literature provides strong support for the proposition
that both QE1 and QE2 were e¤ective in lowering long-term Treasury yields, but
it provides less evidence with respect to how long the e¤ects of the asset purchases
lasted. Studies of the e¤ectiveness of QE include Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack
(2004), DAmico and King (2012), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010),
Hamilton and Wu (2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Li and
Wei (2012), Meaning and Zhu (2011), and Wright (2012). Related work also
includes Fuster and Willen (2010) on the QE e¤ects of purchasing mortgages, Oda
and Ueda (2005) who investigate the Bank of Japans zero interest rate policy from
1999 to 2003, Swanson (2011) on the 1961 Operation Twist, and Joyce, Lasaosa,
Stevens and Tong (2010) on the QE impacts from the Bank of England. Broadly
speaking, there have been two approaches used in this literature to study the
e¤ectiveness of QE1 and QE2: performing an event study on the announcement
day of a large asset purchase, or estimating a time series equilibrium or arbitrage-
free model for the term structure of interest rates.
In an event study, the window after the announcement date is purposely kept
small, usually one or two days, in order to minimize the confounding e¤ect of
changing macro-economic conditions on the observed change in Treasury rates.
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The advantage of an event study is that it does not require the specication of
a particular equilibrium or arbitrage-free model. Hence, the results are robust to
model misspecication. The key disadvantage of an event study is that it only
measures the impact of an asset purchase over the event window considered. Cu-
mulating event window changes over longer time horizons is confounded by changes
in macro-economic conditions. In addition, for their validity, event studies require
two additional assumptions to hold. One, that the announcement was not leaked
before the announcement date, and two, that any price impact is instantaneous
and not lagged across time. It is an open question as to the validity of these
assumptions in Treasury markets.
In a time series model, to measure the impact of QE, the usual approach is to
perform a counter factual experiment. Using a model based on no QE policy, one
can estimate the expected path of the term structure of interest rates. This is the
counter factual control. This no QE policy forecast is then compared with realized
rates (or conditional expectations based on the realized rates) generated under
the QE policy. The di¤erence between these two rates is due to random noise
and QE. The advantage of a time series model is that it captures the changing
macro-economic conditions during the estimation period. The disadvantage of
this approach is that the di¤erence between the expected and realized rates may
include other components, not due to QE, if the time series model is misspecied.
Unfortunately, the models implemented are simplied for analytic or econometric
reasons, making this a reasonable concern.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we estimate the impact of QE on the term
structure of forward rates, and not bond yields. Forward rates correspond to the
"marginal" rate for a future time interval, while yields correspond to the "average"
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rate over a time horizon starting today and ending with the bonds maturity. As
such, since yield are averages of forward rates, yields confound changes in short-
and long- term forward rates. Our study isolates the e¤ects of QE on the di¤erent
maturity forward rates.
The second contribution is to provide a new and alternative methodology for
estimating the impact of QE on the term structure of interest rates. Our method-
ology uses an arbitrage-free term structure evolution that explicitly includes the
impact of the Feds Treasury purchases on the price. As such, our approach is
able to estimate both the magnitude and the duration of QE price impacts on the
term structure of Treasuries. In addition, our methodology can be used to price
interest rate derivatives (e.g. caps, oors, swaptions) given the Feds activities.
By modifying the Feds impact parameters, our methodology can also be used to
forecast/predict changes in interest rate derivative prices due to forecasted changes
in the Feds purchases. The existing approaches for estimating the impact of quan-
titative easing cannot be used for this purpose. The application of our approach
to derivative pricing awaits subsequent research.
The idea behind our methodology is that we can decompose the observed for-
ward rate curve into two components: one is a hypothetical market forward rate
curve without the Feds purchases, and the other is the price impact due to QE.
The advantage of our approach, as contrasted with the existing time series method-
ology, is that we do not need to set up a counter factual experiment. Instead, this
relation is explicitly built into our parametric model for the evolution of the term
structure of interest rates. Our empirical methodology is based on the literature
studying the pricing of derivatives in an arbitrage-free economy with a large trader
(see Jarrow (1992), Bank and Baum (2004), Jarrow, Protter, Roch (2011)). It is
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most closely related to Jarrow, Protter, and Roch (2011) who study the divergence
in an assets price from fundamental value caused by trading activity. Similar to
our methodology, Li and Wei (2012) add a supply factor to Treasury yields, mea-
suring the impact of QE without a counter factual experiment. However, both
the theory and empirical methodology in Li and Wei di¤er from that used in this
dissertation.
The third contribution is to test whether the Feds QE purchases introduced
arbitrage opportunities into the Treasury security markets. It is plausible that
given such large scale purchases, the Fed could over pay for particular maturity
Treasuries causing their risk premium to be distorted relative to close maturity
substitutes. Although the Fed attempted to only purchase undervalued assets (see
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010, p. 47)), it is an open question whether
their purchases were successful in this regard.
Our estimation shows that the term structure of forward rates were a¤ected by
QE, and without the introduction of arbitrage opportunities. Short- and medium-
term forward rates declined (up to 12 years) with the size of the impact decreasing
in maturity. There were no discernible changes in long-term forward rates (greater
than 12 years). The persistence of the price impacts increased with maturity up to
6 years then declined, with half-lives lasting approximately 4, 6, 12, 8 and 4 months
for the 1, 2, 5, 10 and 12 year forwards, respectively. The Feds QE activities did
not a¤ect long-term forward rates, contrary to the Feds stated intentions. This is
not surprising, however, given that the Feds purchase activities were concentrated
on bonds with maturities of less than 10 years (see Figure 2.3).
Since bond yields are averages of forward rates over a bonds maturity, QE did
a¤ect long-term bond yields. The average impacts on bond yields were 327, 26,
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50, 70, and 76 basis points for 1, 2, 5, 10 and 30 years, respectively. These yield
impacts are consistent with those estimated in the existing literature, except for
the 1-year rate. Our 1-year estimated yield change is signicantly greater than
that in the existing literature because it includes the impact of the Feds monetary
policy - keeping short-term rates near the zero lower bound. The existing 1-year
estimates come from an event study (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2011)), which only includes the impact of QE alone. Secondly, unlike the estimates
from an event study, our estimated changes in bond yields are consistent across the
entire term structure. In particular, the 1-year rate change is embedded within the
5-year, 10-year, and 30-year yield changes to be consistent with an arbitrage-free
term structure evolution.
These results can be best understood using the modied expectations hypothe-
sis that always holds in an arbitrage-free term structure model (see Jarrow (2009)).
The expectations hypothesis is modied for risk aversion using adjusted probabili-
ties, instead of the actual probabilities. As in the classical expectations hypothesis,
except for this modication, the time t forward rate for date T is the time t "ex-
pected" spot rate for date T . These results show that the impact of QE on the
future spot rate is "expected" to disappear after 12 years. And in addition, the
e¤ect of a purchase on the future spot rate is "expected" to last longer, the longer
the term of the rate up to about 6 years. Perhaps because most monetary policy
activities occur on the very short-end of the curve, diminishing the lasting power
of any quantity impact on the short-term forward rates.
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2.1 The Model
This section constructs a Heath, Jarrow, Morton (1992) arbitrage-free term struc-
ture of interest rate model augmented to include the price impacts of a large trader,
the Federal Reserve, based on the insights of Jarrow, Protter, Roch (2011). Traded
are default-free zero-coupon bonds of all maturities and a money market account in
a frictionless market. A frictionless market has no transaction costs, no restrictions
on trade (e.g. short sale restrictions), and asset prices are perfectly divisible. All
traders, except the Fed, act as price takers believing their trades have no impact
on the price of the traded Treasuries. In contrast, the Feds purchases are assumed
to have a signicant price impact, the details of which will be presented shortly.
2.1.1 The Term Structure Evolution
We let P (t; T ) denote the time t market price of a zero-coupon bond paying a
dollar at time T . This price is observed at time t and reects the presence of the
Feds purchasing activities. The time t forward rate for date T is denoted F (t; T )
and it is implicitly dened by
P (t; T ) = e 
R T
t
F (t;s)ds: (2.1)
The instantaneous spot rate of interest is dened by R(t)  F (t; t). We note
for subsequent usage in the empirical section that the spot rate of interest is a
hypothetical construct that is unobservable in actual markets.1
We let p(t; T ) denote the hypothetical unobserved zero-coupon bond price that
would exist in the economy if the Fed did not trade. For convenience, we call
1This is because the spot rate is dened by the limit condition: R(t) = lim
!0

1 P (t;t+)
P (t;t+)  1

.
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p(t; T ) the "true" price. We denote the true forward and spot rate by f(t; T ) and
r(t), respectively.
We assume that the true forward rate process evolves according to an N - factor
model:
df(t; T ) = (t; T )dt+
NX
n=1
n(t; T )dWn(t) (2.2)
where Wi(t) for i = 1; :::; N are independent standard Wiener processes, (t; T ) is
the drift of the forward rate process, and n(t; T ) is the volatility of the nth factor.
Of course, we assume the technical conditions necessary for this stochastic di¤er-
ential equation to exist (see Heath, Jarrow, Morton (1992) for these conditions).
At this point, this evolution is quite general. Due to the Wiener processes, the
only economic restriction being imposed is that the forward ratessample path is
continuous in time.
The true price process includes the impact of any expected or unexpected
changes in the markets supply/demand for Treasuries caused by changes in the
business cycle and normal economic activity, for example, an increase in the foreign
demand for Treasuries during "ight-to-quality" episodes in the recent credit crisis.
This process also reects changes in the outstanding supply of Treasury securities
as determined by the U. S. Treasurys auction activities.
2.1.2 The Feds Price Impact
Asmentioned previously, we consider the Fed as a large trader, whose purchase/sales
a¤ect the prices of Treasuries. In the large trader literature mentioned previously,
a large traders purchases/sales are private information (see Jarrow (1992), Bank
and Baum (2004), Jarrow, Protter, Roch (2011)). This implies that the large
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traders price impact occurs at the time of trade, and not before. In contrast, the
Feds purchases/sales are public information, announced in advance of their trades.
As such, in contrast to a large private trader, there will be an announcement e¤ect
on the price of Treasuries prior to their purchases, which needs to be incorporated
into the model.
We consider a partial equilibrium model, similar to Jarrow, Protter, Roch
(2011). Let x(t; T ) denote the time t cumulative changes in the aggregate de-
mand for the T maturity zero-coupon bond caused by the Feds activities, both
the announcements and trades. As such, this consists of two components:
x(t; T ) = y(t; T ) + z(t; T )
where y(t; T )  0 is the time t cumulative changes in the Feds holdings of the
T maturity zero-coupon bond due to their purchases, and z(t; T ) is the markets
time t cumulative change in the demand for the T maturity zero-coupon bond due
to the Feds announcements. For example, at the announcement time in hopes of
obtaining future prots, traders may purchase Treasuries in anticipation of a price
rise at the time of the Feds purchases, causing prices to react immediately.
Given the change in aggregate demand, we assume that the Feds activities
(announcements and trades) a¤ect the evolution of the observed forward rates as
follows:
dF (t; T ) = (t; T )(f(t; T )  F (t; T ))dt+ df(t; T )  d	(t; T ) (2.3)
where (t; T ) corresponds to the rate of mean reversion of the observed to the true
forward rate, g(x(t; T ); T ) corresponds to the marginal impact of the change in ag-
gregate demand dx(t; T ) on the observed forward rate, and d	(t; T )  g(x(t; T ); T )dx(t; T ).
As noted, we assume that the forward rate decreases as aggregate demand in-
creases.
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Solving this stochastic di¤erential equation, we can alternatively express this
assumption as
F (t; T ) = f(t; T ) 
Z t
0
e 
R t
s (u;T )dud	(s; T ): (2.4)
In this form the motivation for this assumption is clear. The observed market
forward rate F (t; T ) can be decomposed into two components. The rst is the
true forward rate f(t; T ), to which the observed rate mean reverts. The second
component is the price impact of the Feds activities, which depend on both the
rate of mean reversion (t; T ) and the marginal impact of the change in aggregate
demand d	(s; T ): At this point, (t; T ) and 	(t; T ) can be very general stochastic
processes. The only restrictions are those necessary to make expression (2.4) well-
dened and exist.2
For subsequent usage, we note that in this reduced form model, the impact
on Treasury prices (T near 0) due to the Feds short-term interest rate monetary
policy are included in this component as well.
Finally, it is important to note that although the Feds holdings y(t; T ) are
observable, the accumulated changes in aggregate demand z(t; T ) are not. Con-
sequently, x(t; T ) is not observable, so that we will not be able to empirically
decompose the marginal impact d	(s; T ) = g(x(s; T ); T )dx(s; T ) into its compo-
nent parts. This explains why we use the simplied notation in expression (2.4)
above.
To facilitate empirical estimation, we impose the following additional structure.
First, we assume that the Fed starts its activities with an announcement at time
0, and the purchases end at some known future time  . Second, we let the Feds
price impact on the T  maturity forward rate be a deterministic function of the
2For example, for each T , 	(t; T ) needs to be a semimartingale.
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rates maturity, i.e.
	(0; T ) = 0; d	(t; T ) = Iftg (T )dt (2.5)
where  (T ) is the marginal price impact rate, per year, and Ifg is an indicator
function. This assumption implies that the Feds purchases do not introduce ad-
ditional randomness into the forward rates evolution. Alternatively stated, the
forward rate process can be viewed as a controlled process where the Fed chooses
the marginal price impact rate.
Last, we let the mean reversion rate also be a deterministic function of the
forward rates maturity, i.e.
(t; T ) = (T ): (2.6)
Under these additional assumptions, we can rewrite expression (2.4) as:
F (t; T ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
f(0; T )
f(t; T )   (T )
(T )
(1  e (T )t), if 0 < t  
f(t; T )   (T )
(T )
(e(T )   1)e (T )t, if t > :
(2.7)
From expression (2.7), we can easily derive the evolution of the observed zero-
coupon bond price.
For 0 < t   we have
P (t; T ) = e 
R T
t F (t;s)ds
= p(t; T ) expf
Z T
t
 (s)
(s)
(1  e (s)t)dsg: (2.8)
For t >  , we have
P (t; T ) = p(t; T ) expf
Z T
t
 (s)
(s)
(e(s)   1)e (s)tdsg (2.9)
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As indicated, the Feds purchases increase the true price p(t; T ) by the propor-
tionality factor given in expressions (2.8) and (2.9). Dening the price impact as
(t; T )  lnP (t; T )  ln p(t; T ); expressions (2.8) and (2.9) imply that
(t; T ) =
8><>:
R T
t
 (s)
(s)
(1  e (s)t)ds, if 0 < t  R T
t
 (s)
(s)
(e(s)   1)e (s)tds, if t > :
(2.10)
We see that the price impact increases as time t increases, then decreases as the
bond approaches its maturity. The price impact is zero at both t = 0 and t = T .
The maximum distortion is achieved at some time t 2 (0;  ]. Of course, the
objective of the empirical section is to estimate the magnitude of this quantity for
the di¤erent maturity Treasury securities during the Feds QE.
2.1.3 The Arbitrage-free Restrictions
We assume that the observed forward rate evolution, before and after the Feds
purchases, is arbitrage-free. This section studies the restrictions that this no arbi-
trage assumption imposes. To obtain these restrictions, we start with expression
(2.7), rewritten in di¤erential form:
dF (t; T ) =
8><>: df(t; T )   (T )e
 (T )tdt, if t  
df(t; T ) +  (T )(e(T )   1)e (T )tdt, if t > :
(2.11)
Here it is seen that the Feds buying activity is deterministic and only a¤ects the
drift of the observed forward rates evolution. Otherwise, the evolution of the
true forward rate process is una¤ected. Thus, one can directly apply the HJM
no arbitrage drift conditions (HJM (1992)) to obtain the following theorem. The
proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 1 No Arbitrage Conditions
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Given (n(t; T ); n(t)) for all n, and ((T );  (T )) for all T , the observed for-
ward rate evolution is arbitrage free if and only if there exist (n(t)) for all n such
that
NX
n=1
n(t; T )n(t) =
NX
n=1
n(t; T )n(t) +
8><>:  (T )e
 (T )t, if 0 < t  
 (T )(1  e(T ) )e (T )t, if t > 
(2.12)
where n(t) (n(t)) are the market prices of risk for factor n with (without) the
Feds price impact.
This theorem shows that in an economy whose term structure evolution is
arbitrage-free, the Feds purchases necessarily change the market prices of risk in
the economy (from n(t) to n(t) for all n). This makes intuitive sense because the
Feds purchases, changing aggregate demand, causes a shifting in the economys
equilibrium. To reduce the traders aggregate demands, to meet the decreased
available supply, equilibrium risk premiummust adjust and expression (2.12) shows
exactly how.
This shift in risk premium can be better understood by studying a one-factor
model. In this case, the HJM no-arbitrage drift restriction is
(t) = (t) +
8><>:
 (T )e (T )t
(t;T )
, if 0 < t  
 (T )(1 e(T ) )e (T )t
(t;T )
, if t > :
(2.13)
Expression (2.13) shows that when the Fed is buying, risk premium must increase
by the positive quantity on the right side of this expression to keep the term
structure evolution arbitrage-free.
We will test below to see if expression (2.12) holds during the QE program.
As mentioned in the introduction, although the Fed attempted to only purchase
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undervalued assets (see Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010, p. 47)), it is
plausible that given such large scale purchases the Fed could have over paid for
particular maturity Treasuries causing their risk premium to be distorted relative
to close maturity substitutes.
2.2 Estimation
This section estimates the Feds QE price impact on the term structure of inter-
est rates using the arbitrage-free term structure model developed in the previous
section. Included in this estimation is the Feds price impact on the spot rate of
interest (the di¤erence between R(t) and r(t)). Because the spot rate of interest
is unobservable and important to the models formulation, we necessarily estimate
the impact parameters using a Kalman lter.3 We start with estimating a one-
factor a¢ ne model,4 and then generalize to more realistic two- and three-factor
models.
2.2.1 The Data
Since QE1 was o¢ cially announced on November 25, 2008 and QE2 was completed
on June 30, 2011, we choose the sample period spanning from November 24, 2008
to June 30, 2011 to estimate the impact of the Feds QE activities.
The term structure of interest rate data is the daily instantaneous forward
rates time series constructed by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (GSW (2007)) and
3Bolder (2001) provides a good technical guide on implementing a Kalman lter.
4This is sometimes called a Vasicek (1977) model.
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available on the Federal Reserve website.5 This data set contains 30 forward rates
with maturities ranging from 1 year to 30 years. The GSW data is based on the
forward rate smoothing procedure described in Svensson (1994), which assumes a
parametric form with six parameters, and it is chosen for easy comparison with
the existing literature.6
Figure 1.1 graphs the Federal funds rate before and during the QE1 and QE2
estimation period. As seen, the Fed funds rate drop to near zero corresponds
with the start of the QE time period. This implies that our estimates of the
Feds impact on bond prices will also reect the impact of the Feds short-term
interest rate monetary policy activities as well. As discussed in the introduction
chapter, the Fed funds rate being maintained close to the zero lower bound is an
important reason for determining the additional e¤ectiveness of both QE1 and
QE2 in lowering long-term interest rates.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the di¤erent maturity forward rates
over the sample period. This table provides a benchmark for the level of forward
rates and their standard deviations over the estimation period. Figure 2.1 plots
the forward ratestime series evolutions. Interestingly, one can see a decline in the
observed forward rates between 2008 and 2011, most pronounced for the 1, 2, 3,
and 5 year forward rates.
Figure 2.2 graphs the evolution of the Feds balance sheet over the sample
period.7 The Feds purchases mainly focused on mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
during QE1 and Treasury securities during QE2. This di¤erence in the types of
5https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm
6We also explored the estimation using forward rates based on a polynomial spline smoothing
procedure yielding similar results. For brevity these results are not reported in the subsequent
text.
7Data source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
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Figure 2.1: Time-series of GSW Forward Rates
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Figure 2.2: Federal Reserves Holdings of Treasuries, MBS and Agency Debt
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Maturity (year) Mean (%) Std Skewness Kurtosis
1 0.6925 0.2651 0.1080 2.2363
2 1.5845 0.4574 -0.1564 2.2357
3 2.5465 0.5495 -0.3282 2.1799
4 3.4148 0.5733 -0.4328 2.2141
5 4.1280 0.5566 -0.4907 2.3009
6 4.6753 0.5206 -0.5112 2.4173
7 5.0688 0.4783 -0.5192 2.5881
8 5.3303 0.4379 -0.5528 2.8596
9 5.4838 0.4046 -0.6407 3.2392
10 5.5523 0.3831 -0.7762 3.6518
11 5.5559 0.3775 -0.9166 3.9903
12 5.5119 0.3902 -1.0248 4.2518
13 5.4342 0.4203 -1.1017 4.5078
14 5.3340 0.4645 -1.1650 4.7551
15 5.2200 0.5187 -1.2232 4.9368
20 4.6211 0.8293 -1.4136 4.7804
25 4.1592 1.0822 -1.4696 4.2606
30 3.8604 1.2457 -1.4651 3.9361
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
asset purchased across QE1 and QE2 suggests that there may be di¤ering price
impacts. We explore this possibility in our estimation below.
Figure 2.3 provides a breakdown of the Feds Treasury holdings by maturity
over our sample period. For their Treasury security purchases, the Feds activities
are mostly concentrated on securities with maturities between one and ten years.
These holdings will be relevant when discussing the QEs impact on bond price
yields in subsequent sections.
Relevant to the Feds Treasury purchases and their impact on forward rates is
the outstanding supply of Treasury securities during the QE period. As mentioned
earlier, we do not explicitly adjust our estimates of the Feds QE impact on forward
rates for changes in the outstanding supply of Treasuries. In our methodology, this
20
Figure 2.3: Breakdown of Treasury Holdings by Maturity
supply adjustment is implicitly captured through its impact on the estimated true
forward rate process (the drift and volatilities) over this time period. A potential
concern with our methodology, therefore, is that if the U. S. Treasury purposely
increased its auction of Treasuries to take advantage of the Feds QE activities,
then our estimated price impacts would be biased low. To investigate this potential
bias, Figure 2.4 shows the time series of newly auctioned Treasury securities over
the QE period.8 As seen, the newly auctioned Treasuries are quite stable and
only slightly increasing across time, the upward trend reecting an increase in the
size of the Federal budget decit over this same time period. It does not appear
that the U.S. Treasurys auction process was directly inuenced by the Feds QE
activities, minimizing this potential bias in our estimation methodology.
8Data source: http://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/annceresult/press/preanre/preanre.htm
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Figure 2.4: Amount of Newly Auctioned Treasury Securities
2.2.2 A One-Factor Model
This section estimates a one-factor a¢ ne model for the evolution of the term
structure of interest rates. We start with the one-factor model to both illustrate
the methodology and to provide a benchmark for comparing the results for two-
and three-factor models.
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The Methodology
In the one-factor a¢ ne model, the true forward rates evolution given by expression
(2.2) can be written as:
f(t; T ) = (1  e k(T t))

   
2
r
2k2
 
1  e k(T t)+ e k(T t)rt (2.14)
where the state variable rt is the true instantaneous spot rate. Substitution into
expression (2.7) gives the observed forward rate process, including the Feds price
impact:
F (t; T ) (2.15)
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1  e k(T t))

   2r
2k2
 
1  e k(T t)+ e k(T t)rt    (T )(T ) (1  e (T )t),
if 0 < t  
(1  e k(T t))

   2r
2k2
 
1  e k(T t)+ e k(T t)rt    (T )(T ) (e(T )   1)e (T )t,
if t > :
As mentioned previously, since the spot rate is unobservable9, to estimate our
system we use a Kalman lter. In our Kalman lter, the time-discretized state
transition equation for the spot rate is given by
rt+t = (1  e kt) + e ktrt + r"t (2.16)
where "t follows a standard normal distribution.
As indicated, this evolution allows the spot rate to be negative with positive
probability. Although alternative evolutions could be used that preclude negative
9Instead, one could obtain estimated spot rates using the intercept of the smoothed GSW
forward rate curve with the y-axis. We choose not to use these estimates because the intercept
with the y-axis explicitly depends on the functional form of the smoothing function, which in turn,
is greatly inuenced by the prices of the long-term Treasuries. In reality, short-term Treasury
rates (less than one year) are inuenced more by the impact of the Feds short-term interest rate
policies than the assumed shape of a smoothing function. Our estimation methodology avoids
this potential bias.
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rates, both economic theory and the empirical evidence are more consistent with
evolutions that allow negative (nominal) rates with positive probability. Indeed,
from a theoretical perspective, large nancial institutions cannot store currency,
they can only invest it in either deposits or securities; and consequently, negative
rates are possible. Empirically, negative rates on Treasuries were observed in each
of November 2009, June 2011, and August 2011;10 and the Bank of New York
Mellon paid negative deposit rates in August 2011.11
For the Kalman lter, the measurement equation is given by the evolution of
the observed forward rate process:
F (t;i) = Ai +Birt + ut(i) (2.17)
where
Ai =
8><>: (1  e
 ki)

   2r
2k2
 
1  e ki   i
i
(1  e it), if 0 < t  
(1  e ki)

   2r
2k2
 
1  e ki   i
i
(ei   1)e it, if t > 
(2.18)
Bi = e
 ki, and i = Ti   t:
For simplicity, we assume ut(i) follows an independent normal distribution.
We estimate the parameters using three forward rate series (i = 1yr; 2yr; 3yr).
The parameters to be estimated are (k; ; r;  1; 1;  2; 2;  3; 3).
10See WSJ Blog, Market Beat, November 20, 2009, "Some Treasury Bill Rates Negative Again
Friday;" Bloomberg, November 19, 2009, "U.S. 3-month Bills Turn Negative on Concern Risk
Rally Overdone;" Bloomberg, June 27, 2011, "Treasury 4-week Bill Rates Negative for First Time
since 2010;" WSJ Blog, Market Beat, August 4, 2011, "From One Crisis to Another: One Month
T-Bill Yields go Negative Again."
11See Bloomberg.com/news, August 5, 2011, "BNY Mellon Makes Clients Pay for Deposits as
Investors Seek Safety in Cash;" Online WSJ, August 5, 2011, "New Fee to Bank Cash."
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Parameter Estimate Std
θ 0.037 0.003
k 0.234 0.017
σr 0.013 0.001
λ1 2.20 0.29
λ2 1.28 0.21
λ3 0.0001 0.13
ψ1 0.053 0.008
ψ2 0.023 0.004
ψ3 0.0037 0.001
Table 2.2: One-Factor Parameter Estimates
Figure 2.5: One-factor Estimation of the Instantaneous Short Rate
The Results
The parameter estimates are shown in Table 2.2 and the evolution of the true spot
rate is plotted as the dashed curve in Figure 2.5.
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The spot rate, with the Feds impact included, is the limit of expression (2.15)
as T ! t, i.e.
Rt = rt  
8><>:
 (0)
(0)
(1  e (0)t), if 0 < t  
 (0)
(0)
(e(0)   1)e (0)t, if t > :
To obtain an estimate of this spot rate, we use the estimates of ((1);  (1)) instead
of ((0);  (0)). The corresponding estimated short rate (denoted by Rt) is plotted
as the dotted curve in Figure 2.5. The di¤erence (rt Rt) is the Feds price impact,
which is plotted as the solid curve. A positive and upward trending price impact
curve in Figure 2.5 is consistent with the facts that the Feds monetary policy was
targeting near zero short-term rates, and the Fed had been continuously purchasing
Treasury securities over the estimation period. It shows that, under the one-factor
model, the Feds price impact on the short rate has been increasing since QE
started, and stayed in the range of 2:3%  2:4% until the end of June 2011.
Table 2.2 presents the estimated price impact parameters for the one-, two-, and
three- year forward rates (i,  i) for i = 1; 2; 3. The marginal impact parameter
is decreasing in maturity, i.e.  1 >  2 >  3. In contrast, the mean reversion
parameter is increasing with maturity, i.e. 1 > 2 > 3. This implies that the
duration of the price impact increases with maturity. Dening the half-life of the
price impact as the time ti0 = ln(2)=i for i = 1; 2; 3, then t
1
0 = 0:32  3:8 months
and t20 = 0:54  6:5 months. The half life of the price impact of the 3-year forward
rate is not dened since 3 is insignicantly di¤erent from zero.
These results can be best understood using the modied expectations hypothe-
sis that always holds in an arbitrage-free term structure model (see Jarrow (2009)).
The expectations hypothesis is modied for risk aversion using adjusted probabil-
ities, instead of the actual probabilities.12 As in the classical expectations hypoth-
12These adjusted probabilities are called the forward price martingale probability measures,
26
esis, except for this modication, the time t forward rate for date T is the time
t "expected" spot rate for date T . These results show that the impact of QE on
the future spot rate is "expected" to decline as time progresses. And in addition,
the e¤ect of a purchase on the future spot rate is "expected" to last longer, the
longer the term of the rate. Perhaps because most monetary policy activities occur
on the very short-end of the curve, diminishing the lasting power of any quantity
impact on the short-term forward rates.
2.2.3 An N-Factor Model
The above estimation procedure can be extended to a N - factor a¢ ne model,
where the short rate is a sum of N factors
r(t) =
NX
n=1
zn(t): (2.19)
Each factor zn(t) evolves as
dzn(t) = kn(n   zn(t))dt+ ndWn(t) (2.20)
where Wi(t) for i = 1; :::; N are independent standard Wiener processes.
Under this framework, one can show that the zero-coupon bond price is13
P (t; T ) = exp
(
C(t; T ) 
NX
n=1
Dn(t; T )zn(t)
)
(2.21)
where
Dn(t; T ) =
1  e kn(T t)
kn
C(t; T ) =  
NX
n=1
n

T   t+ e
 kn(T t)   1
kn

:
see Jarrow (2009).
13For the technical details, see Chapter 4 of Brigo and Mercurio (2006), Chapter 2 of Jeanblanc,
Yor and Chesney (2009), and Bolder (2001).
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The corresponding forward rates are
F (t; T ) =  @ lnP (t; T )
@T
=
NX
n=1
@Dn(t; T )
@T
zn(t)  @C(t; T )
@T
=
NX
n=1
e kn(T t)zn(t) +
NX
n=1
n

1  e kn(T t) : (2.22)
Therefore, the time-discretized state transition equation can be written as
zn(t+t) = n(1  e knt) + e kntzn(t) + "n(t) n = 1; :::; N (2.23)
where "n(t) follow zero-mean normal distributions with the following variance and
covariance
V ar ["n(t)jFt t] = 
2
n
2kn
 
1  e 2knt
Cov["n(t); "m(t)jFt t] = 0 n 6= m
where Ft is the natural ltration generated by the state variables process up to
time t.
Recall that expression (2.7) describes the relation between the unobserved for-
ward rates without the Feds impact (f(t; T )) and the observed forward rates with
the Feds impact (F (t; T )). Combining expressions (2.7) and (2.22), we obtain the
measurement equation:
F (t;i) = Ai +
NX
n=1
Bi;nzn(t) + ut(i) (2.24)
where ut(i) are assumed to follow independent normal distributions,
Bi;n = e
 kni, and i = Ti   t:
For 0 < t   ,
Ai =
NX
n=1
n

1  e kni   i
i
(1  e it):
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Parameter Estimate Std
θ1 0.002 1.647
θ2 0.058 1.646
k1 0.145 0.009
k2 0.479 0.046
σ1 0.0121 0.0005
σ2 0.0001 0.001
λ1 2.03 0.22
λ2 1.53 0.21
λ3 0.91 0.18
λ4 0.16 0.21
ψ1 0.061 0.009
ψ2 0.039 0.007
ψ3 0.018 0.004
ψ4 0.006 0.002
Table 2.3: Two-Factor Parameter Estimates
For t >  ,
Ai =
NX
n=1
n

1  e kni   i
i
(ei   1)e it:
The Results
This section estimates both two- and three-factor models. We estimate the para-
meters using four forward rates (i = 1; 2; 3; 4 years). For the two-factor model,
the parameters to be estimated are (ki, i, i, ( j, j)j=1;2;3;4)i=1;2 and the results
are shown in Table 2.3. For the three-factor model, the parameters to be estimated
are (ki, i, i, ( j, j)j=1;2;3;4)i=1;2;3 and the results are shown in Table 2.4. For
comparison with the existing literature estimating a¢ ne models without Fed pur-
chases, Table 2.4 provides the estimates for this model as well. These estimates
without the Fed purchases included are consistent with those found in the existing
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Parameter Estimate Std Estimate Std
θ1 0.003 1.30 0.025 0.803
θ2 0.039 1.44 0.046 0.818
θ3 0.031 0.95 0.018 0.797
k1 0.104 0.008 0.134 0.006
k2 0.446 0.072 0.134 0.108
k3 0.104 0.672 0.588 0.071
σ1 0.0106 0.0005 0.0107 0.0003
σ2 0.0039 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009
σ3 0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 0.0011
λ1 2.01 0.18
λ2 1.51 0.17
λ3 1.14 0.16
λ4 0.73 0.18
ψ1 0.081 0.012
ψ2 0.057 0.010
ψ3 0.036 0.008
ψ4 0.02 0.006
lnL
With Impact Without Impact
11171 11065
Table 2.4: Three-factor Parameter Estimates
literature (see Babbs and Nowman (1999)).
The estimates of n (n = 1; 2; 3) have large standard errors because the ex-
pression for Ai reveals that the model has poor identication for the individual n.
However, i and  i can be estimated with much higher precision.
Consistent with the results from the one-factor model, we nd that the mag-
nitude of the impact on the i- year forward rate becomes smaller as i gets larger
( j >  i for j < i), while the impact on the i- year forward rate lasts longer for
larger i (1=j < 1=i for j < i). The half-lives of the impact for the two-factor
model is t10 = 0:34  4:1 months, t20 = 0:45  5:4 months, t30 = 0:76  9:1 months,
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Parameter Estimate Std Half-life(months) Parameter Estimate Std
λ1 2.01 0.18 4.1 ψ1 0.081 0.012
λ2 1.51 0.17 5.5 ψ2 0.057 0.01
λ3 1.14 0.16 7.3 ψ3 0.036 0.008
λ4 0.73 0.18 11.4 ψ4 0.020 0.006
λ5 0.69 0.10 12.1 ψ5 0.015 0.0013
λ6 0.48 0.11 17.3 ψ6 0.010 0.0011
λ7 0.52 0.11 16.0 ψ7 0.010 0.0012
λ8 0.62 0.14 13.4 ψ8 0.010 0.0017
λ9 0.85 0.11 9.8 ψ9 0.012 0.0015
λ10 1.06 0.16 7.8 ψ10 0.012 0.0019
λ11 1.70 0.14 4.9 ψ11 0.015 0.003
λ12 2.14 0.23 3.9 ψ12 0.016 0.0031
λ13 2.59 2.91 - ψ13 0.007 0.009
λ14 3.16 3.87 - ψ14 0.008 0.017
Table 2.5: Term Structure of the Feds Impact
and the half-lives of the three-factor model is t10 = 0:34  4:1 months, t20 = 0:46 
5:5 months, t30 = 0:61  7:3 months, t40 = 0:95  11:4 months. The fact that the
two-factor and three-factor models give similar results shows the robustness of the
estimation procedure.
To determine the impact of the Feds QE program on long-term rates, Table
2.5 presents the Feds impact parameters estimated using a three-factor model for
all maturity forward rates ranging from one to thirty years. This is the key Table
of this chapter. These parameter estimates are obtained by tting a three-factor
model using the forward rates ( = 1; 2; 3; i years) for i = 5; 6; ::: ; 30 where the
parameters ( j, j)j=1;2;3 are xed at their values given in Table 2.4. Hence, only
the parameters (ki, i, i)i=1;2;3 and ( i, i) are reestimated where i corresponds
to the longest term forward rate used in the estimation. This two-step procedure
is invoked because there are too many parameters to estimate in the larger system
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of equations, given the size of our data set.
As seen in Table 2.5, only the rst 12 year forward ratesmarginal price impact
parameters ( , ) are signicantly di¤erent from zero. Because the impacts on
rates beyond twelve years are all insignicantly di¤erent from zero, only the results
for maturities less than 14 years are shown. A graphic representation of these
estimates is given in Figure 2.6. The top panel plots the half-life of the impact for
each maturity forward rate. These results show that the half-life increases as the
maturity increases up to about 6 years, then declines thereafter. The lower panel
plots the magnitudes of the marginal price impacts. They decrease monotonically
as the maturity increases.
These results show that the Feds QE program a¤ects only short- and medium-
term forward rates, up to about 12 years. After 12 years, the Feds QE program
has no discernible e¤ect on forward rates. This is in contrast to the Feds stated
intention of QE to a¤ect long-term rates. The absence of any impact on long-
term forward rates is not surprising given that the Fed concentrated its Treasury
purchases on maturities of less than 10 years (see Figure 2.3). Although there is
a spill-over e¤ect on the 11- and 12- year maturity Treasuries, there is little if any
spill-over on the 20 and 30 year bonds. If the Fed hopes to a¤ect the long-term
forward rates, the evidence suggests that they need to purchase the long-term
bonds directly.
This does not mean, however, that the Feds QE program does not a¤ect long-
term bond yields. It does because long-term bond yields are an average of the
forward rates over the bonds life, and the Feds QE program has a large impact
on short-term forward rates. The impact of the Feds QE program on bond yields
is presented in a subsequent section.
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Figure 2.6: Term Structure of the QE Impact
2.2.4 Separating QE1 and QE2
As mentioned earlier and shown in Figure 2.2, the Feds asset purchases di¤ered
across QE1 and QE2. For this reason, it is likely that the price impact on Trea-
suries di¤ered across these two periods. This section addresses this possibility by
estimating the models parameters separately for each of the two time periods. To
capture any information leakage, we choose the estimation periods for both QE
events to start one day ahead of the o¢ cial announcement, i.e., the QE1 estimation
period spans from November 24, 2008 to March 31, 2010, and the QE2 estimation
period ranges from November 2, 2010 to June 30, 2011.
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Figure 2.7: Impact of QE1
Due to the small sample size, estimating a three-factor a¢ ne model for each
sub-period generates too large a set of sample errors and inconclusive results.
Therefore, in order to get more reliable estimates, we t a one-factor model. To
justify this simplication, we performed the analysis on only the short- to medium-
section of the term structure, up to 8 years. A principal component analysis (PCA)
using forward rates with maturities of less than eight years conrms that the rst
principal component accounts for 93% of the variation, showing that a one-factor
model provides a good approximation for this section of the term structure.
The estimation results for QE1 and QE2 are shown in Table 2.6 (Figure 2.7
and Figure 2.8 provide graphic views). Similar to the previous results obtained
using the whole sample period (Table 2.5 and Figure 2.6), we nd that the impacts
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Parameter Estimate Std
Half-life
(months) Parameter Estimate Std
λ1 2.13 0.76 3.9 ψ1 0.077 0.029
λ2 1.48 1.02 5.6 ψ2 0.042 0.017
λ3 0.61 0.58 13.6 ψ3 0.005 0.003
λ4 Large - 0 ψ4 0 -
λ5 Large - 0 ψ5 0 -
λ6 Large - 0 ψ6 0 -
λ7 Large - 0 ψ7 0 -
Panel A: QE1 Period
Parameter Estimate Std Half-life(months) Parameter Estimate Std
λ1 3.25 0.81 2.6 ψ1 0.11 0.031
λ2 2.17 0.55 3.8 ψ2 0.065 0.011
λ3 0.65 0.54 12.8 ψ3 0.018 0.005
λ4 0.91 0.88 9.5 ψ4 0.003 0.001
λ5 Large - 0 ψ5 0 -
λ6 Large - 0 ψ6 0 -
λ7 Large - 0 ψ7 0 -
Panel B: QE2 Period
Table 2.6: Term Structure of the Feds Impact
of both QEs are limited to the one- to four- year forward rates. For maturities
longer than four years, the estimates of the mean reversion parameter  are denoted
"Large" because in the numerical convergence procedure use for optimizing the
likelihood function, the estimates always reach the pre-set upper bound, even when
the upper bound is set at very large values (> 50). Since the half-life is the inverse
of , a large  means that the price impact lasts for only a very short period.
Perhaps not surprising given that QE2s purchases concentrated on Treasuries
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Figure 2.8: Impact of QE2
instead of MBS and agencies as in QE1 (see Figure 2.2), we nd that for maturities
less than four years, QE2s price impact on Treasury rates is larger than that of
QE1. However, the duration of the impact lasts longer in QE1 than in QE2. For
instance, QE1s impact on the two-year rate lasts for 5:6 months with magnitude
of 4:2% per year, while QE2s impact on the same rate lasts for 3:8 months with
a magnitude of 6:5% per year. It is important to note that although the direct
purchases of Treasury securities have a larger price impact on Treasury rates than
do the purchases of MBS and agencies, the price impact on Treasuries of purchas-
ing these alternative assets is signicant. These results conrm the belief that
asset substitution is an important e¤ect of Fed purchases in xed income security
markets (see Bernanke and Reinhart (2004)).
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2.2.5 Test for Arbitrage
Given the parameter estimates from Table 2.5, we can test for the satisfaction of
expression (2.12) to see whether the Feds QE Treasury purchases distorted risk
premium and introduced arbitrage opportunities into the economy. Since the QE
purchases only a¤ected forward rate maturities of less than or equal to 12 years,
we only use these rates to test this proposition.
For the three-factor model, from expression (2.12), we have that
1(t;j)1(t) + 2(t;j)2(t) + 3(t;j)3(t)
=  (j)e
 (j)t for 0 < t   (2.25)
where n(t) = n(t)  n(t) and (j = 1; :::; 12 years).
To understand the intuition underlying our testing procedure, consider solv-
ing expression (2.25) for (1(t);2(t);3(t)) using any three-tuple of dis-
tinct maturity forward rates. In general, the solution for (1(t);2(t);3(t))
will depend upon the particular forward rate maturities selected. Theorem 1
states that the evolution is arbitrage-free if and only if this is not the case, i.e.
no matter which three-tuple of forward rates is selected, the same solution for
(1(t);2(t);3(t)) must occur. We test this observation below.
To formulate our test statistic, x a time t in the QE time period, and let yjt =
 (j)e
 (j)t, xjt = (1(t;j); 2(t;j); 3(t;j))0, and t = (1(t);2(t);3(t)).
Note that in this notation, we are assuming that t does not depend on the forward
rates maturity. First, we estimate t using a simple linear regression
yjt = txjt + "jt for j = 1; :::; 12 (2.26)
where "jt are assumed to be i:i:d: normal distributions with zero mean, representing
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observational noise in the data.
If expression (2.25) is true, the null hypothesis, excluding the noise in the data
we would expect to see "jt  0 for all j. However, given noise in the data, we would
expect to see var("jt) small relative to var(yjt). To test this expectation, we form
the test statistic st =
P12
j=1(yjt xjtbt)2=var(yjt) where bt represents the regression
estimate from expression (2.26). The test statistic st has a 2 distribution with
9 degrees of freedom (12 data points are used to estimate 3 parameters). If st is
large, we can reject the null hypothesis of no arbitrage.
Estimating expression (2.26) for each day (t) over the sample period we obtain
a time-series of the estimated market prices of risk bt, which are plotted in Panel
A of Figure 2.9, and the test statistic, which is graphed in Panel B of Figure 2.9.
As seen, the test statistic is well below the 5% signicance threshold. We can
not reject the null hypothesis that there is no arbitrage over the QE period. As
intended, the Feds QE program appears to have been successful in not introducing
arbitrage opportunities into the economy. A qualication of our results needs to
be noted. Since our parameters are estimated with smoothed Treasury price data,
the smoothing procedure could itself remove arbitrage opportunitites, providing
only a weak test of our hypothesis. A better test would involve using unsmoothed
Treasury prices directly.
2.3 Model Specication Tests
This section provides various model specication tests that support the models
validity.
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Figure 2.9: Test for Arbitrage
2.3.1 A Comparison Pre- QE
To test the models specication, we estimated the three-factor model for two
time periods before the onset of QE1. One is from January 2, 2001 to August 1,
2003, when the Fed lowered interest rates, and the second from January 2, 2004 to
August 1, 2006, when the Fed increased interest rates. If the additional structure
in our model captures the Feds QE activities, one would expect to see the mean
reversion and marginal impact parameters (;  ) insignicantly di¤erent from zero
during these time periods. The parameters are estimated using four forward rates
(i = 1; 2; 3; 4 years) and the results are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
For the period when the Fed was lowering interest rates, all of the impact para-
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Parameter Estimate Std Estimate Std
θ1 0.021 0.82 0.023 0.82
θ2 0.02 0.82 0.029 0.82
θ3 0.022 0.82 0.024 0.82
k1 0.59 0.31 0.26 0.15
k2 0.28 0.06 0.25 0.02
k3 0.28 0.12 0.25 0.03
σ1 0.0001 0.015 0.005 0.009
σ2 0.032 0.009 0.026 0.005
σ3 0.016 0.007 0.021 0.005
λ1 1.35 0.62
λ2 0.75 0.64
λ3 0.35 0.71
λ4 0 0.9
ψ1 0.071 0.023
ψ2 0.035 0.015
ψ3 0.017 0.011
ψ4 0.008 0.008
lnL
With Impact Without Impact
9563 9508
Table 2.7: Robustness Check: Jan. 2, 2001 - Aug. 1, 2003
meters (,  ) are insignicantly di¤erent from zero, except for the price impacts of
the one- and two- year rates. Although the one-year rate impact is signicant, its
magnitude (0:071) is less than its magnitude (0:081) in the QE period (see Table
2.4). The same is true for the two-year rate. These impacts on the shortest term
forward rates are consistent with the Feds direct monetary policy activities having
a spill over e¤ect on the one- and two- year rates.
For the period when the Fed was increasing interest rates, all of the marginal
impact parameters ( ) are insignicantly di¤erent from zero, except for the four-
year rate. The mean reversion parameters () are signicant for years two through
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Parameter Estimate Std Estimate Std
θ1 0.006 0.94 0.02 0.82
θ2 0.071 1.25 0.022 0.82
θ3 0.009 0.95 0.018 0.82
k1 0.45 0.08 0.98 0.06
k2 0.21 0.02 0.2 0.03
k3 0.21 0.04 0.2 0.03
σ1 0.0001 0.005 0.069 0.007
σ2 0.019 0.003 0.015 0.002
σ3 0.012 0.005 0.013 0.003
λ1 0.87 0.38
λ2 1.59 0.31
λ3 1.11 0.21
λ4 1.2 0.16
ψ1 -0.01 0.007
ψ2 0.0006 0.007
ψ3 0.01 0.005
ψ4 0.018 0.004
lnL
With Impact Without Impact
10738 10698
Table 2.8: Robustness Check: Jan. 2, 2004 - Aug. 1, 2006
four. The signicance for years two and three are irrelevant, since the market
impact parameter is not di¤erent from zero. The signicance of both of the price
impact parameters (,  ) for the four-year rate is probably due to noise in the data,
but it could be due to the simplicity of the model being estimated. A resolution of
these two possibilities awaits the estimation of more complex models in subsequent
research.
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2.3.2 Likelihood Ratio Tests, Pre- and Post- QE
This section provides likelihood ratio tests for the model with and without the
Feds impact function for all three sample periods, both pre- and post- QE. These
results are given in Tables 2.4, 2.7, and 2.8. The test statistic is 2(ln(L1)  ln(L2)),
where L1 (L2) is the maximized likelihood value with (without) the price impact
term.
At the 5% signicance level, the likelihood ratio test rejects the model without
the price impact for all three sample periods. This is to be expected since this
is an in sample test, and the price impact model has more parameters. More
insightful is a comparison of the magnitudes of the changes in the likelihood values
over the di¤erent sample periods. For the 1/2/2001-8/1/2003 sample (no QE),
the log-likelihood increases by 0.6% after adding the price impact term. For the
1/2/2004-8/1/2006 (no QE) sample period, the increase is only 0.4%. In contrast,
for the QE period, the log-likelihood increases the most, by 1%, after adding the
price impact term. These relative changes in the likelihood ratio tests are consistent
with the validity of the model.
2.3.3 Pricing Errors
Another way to test the models specication is to study the models pricing errors
in matching the observed forward rates. Table 2.9 presents the statistical properties
of the forward rate errors for our three factor model (whose parameters are given in
Table 2.4). Panel A shows the result for the model with the price impact term (call
it the "adjusted model") and Panel B shows the result without the price impact
term (call it the "conventional model").
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Maturity
(year)
Mean
(bp) SE t Skew Kurt ρ(1) ρ(10) ρ(20)
1 -2.10 0.75 -2.80 0.14 2.32 0.93 0.75 0.60
2 -3.97 0.73 -5.45 0.34 2.62 0.88 0.52 0.25
3 -2.30 1.07 -2.16 -0.24 2.61 0.94 0.71 0.50
4 -1.86 1.29 -1.44 -0.53 2.90 0.95 0.76 0.56
5 -1.59 1.44 -1.10 -0.55 2.88 0.97 0.76 0.56
6 0.49 1.47 0.34 -0.51 3.01 0.97 0.74 0.55
7 1.43 1.37 1.04 -0.32 3.19 0.96 0.71 0.50
8 1.29 1.31 0.98 -0.37 3.11 0.96 0.68 0.47
9 3.40 1.24 2.74 -0.47 3.02 0.96 0.67 0.45
10 1.01 1.23 0.82 -0.58 3.13 0.96 0.68 0.46
11 0.37 1.14 0.32 -0.57 2.92 0.96 0.66 0.43
12 -1.08 1.24 -0.87 -0.56 3.12 0.96 0.71 0.49
13 0.64 1.25 0.51 -0.51 2.71 0.96 0.71 0.51
14 -1.36 1.27 -1.07 -0.31 2.45 0.97 0.73 0.54
Panel A (With the price impact term)
Maturity
(year)
Mean
(bp) SE t Skew Kurt ρ(1) ρ(10) ρ(20)
1 -3.84 0.71 -5.43 0.30 2.29 0.93 0.69 0.50
2 -15.08 0.83 -18.16 0.38 3.07 0.91 0.56 0.28
3 -6.14 1.28 -4.79 -0.13 2.31 0.96 0.76 0.56
4 4.84 1.50 3.24 -0.35 2.28 0.97 0.80 0.63
5 2.58 1.52 1.70 -0.43 2.41 0.97 0.79 0.62
6 -0.36 1.47 -0.24 -0.45 2.59 0.97 0.76 0.59
7 -1.96 1.40 -1.40 -0.45 2.81 0.97 0.73 0.55
8 -3.92 1.35 -2.91 -0.50 3.09 0.97 0.72 0.52
9 -3.00 1.32 -2.28 -0.60 3.40 0.97 0.71 0.51
10 -1.41 1.33 -1.06 -0.73 3.66 0.97 0.72 0.51
11 0.60 1.26 0.47 -0.66 3.24 0.96 0.73 0.53
12 -1.62 1.47 -1.10 -0.94 4.10 0.97 0.78 0.59
13 -0.89 1.61 -0.55 -1.03 4.37 0.98 0.82 0.66
14 -1.06 1.76 -0.60 -1.11 4.62 0.98 0.85 0.71
Panel B (Without the price impact term)
Table 2.9: Summary Statistics of Pricing Errors
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The pricing errors for the adjusted model (Panel A) are quite small, on the order
of 2 basis points. Compared to Panel B, one can see that for maturities within
ve years, the average pricing errors estimated from the conventional model are
signicantly larger than those from the adjusted model. For maturities longer
than ve years, the two models generate pricing errors with similar magnitudes.
This evidence is consistent with the Feds price impact on long-term forward rates
being small. The pricing errors for both models exhibit autocorrelations, perhaps
indicating that a more complex model may provide a better t.
It is important to note that these results are similar in magnitude to the pric-
ing errors obtained in the 4-factor a¢ ne model estimated by Adrian, Crump and
Moench (2012, Table 4), where instead of adding the Feds deterministic price im-
pact component, one adds an additional Brownian motion random shock to the
forward rates evolution. The ability of the deterministic price impact component
to match the performance of an additional random factor lends credence to the
validity of the model.
2.4 Comparison to Existing Literature
This section compares our price impact estimates with those in the existing empir-
ical literature. The estimates in the existing empirical literature are summarized
in Table 2.10, Panel A for ve studies: DAmico and King (2011), Gagnon, Raskin,
Remache, and Sack (2010), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Li and
Wei (2012), and Meaning and Zhu (2011). The existing literature studies the price
impact on bond yields for maturities ranging between 1 - 30 years. As seen, the
estimated price impact is around 40 basis points for short-term rates (less than 5
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Paper Event Methodology
1yr 2yr 3yr 5yr 10yr 30yr
Event study
(Cumulative
response)
-34 -91
Time-series
regression
-52
QE1
Event study
(Cumulative
response)
-25 -39 -74 -107 -73
QE2
Event study
(Cumulative
response)
-2 -8 -20 -30 -21
Stock effect -30
Flow effect
Li and Wei
(2012)
QE1&2
Time-series
estimation
-100
Meaning and
Zhu (2011)
QE2
Panel
regression
-21bp on the whole yield curve
on average
Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-
Jorgensen
(2011)
D’Amico and
King (2012)
QE1
-3.5bp on the sector purchased
Treasury Yield Changes (bp)
Gagnon,
Raskin,
Remache, and
Sack (2010)
QE1
Panel A: Other PapersResults
Event
1yr 2yr 5yr 10yr 30yr
-327 -26 -50 -70 -76
Treasury Yield Changes (bp)
QE1 and QE2
Panel B: Our Results
Table 2.10: Comparison with Other PapersResults
years), and 75 - 100 basis points for long-term yields (greater than 5 years). To
make this comparison, we need to transform our estimated impacts on forward
rates from the three-factor model in Table 5 to changes in bond yields.
This transformation is a multi-step process. First, we compute the changes in
the true and observed constant maturity zero-coupon bond prices using expression
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Figure 2.10: QE Impacts on Bond Yields
(2.10). Then, given these true and observed constant maturity zero-coupon bond
prices, we compute the true constant maturity par-bond yields for bonds with
maturities 2 - 30 years.14 These true par-bond yields give the coupon payments
to use for computing the prices of the observed bonds, using the observed zero-
coupon bond prices. Finally, from these observed bond prices, we can compute the
observed yields. A comparison of the true par-bond yields with the observed yields
generates the desired change in the Treasury yields due to the Feds QE activities.
These yield changes are contained in Table 2.10, Panel B and graphed in Figure
2.10.
14A par bond yield is that coupon payment that makes a bonds current price equal its face
value ($100). We compute the true coupon bonds par-bond yield using the true zero-coupon
bond prices.
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As seen, the average yield changes are 327, 26, 50, 70, and 76 basis points for
the 1, 2, 5, 10, and 30 year bond yields. Except for the 1-year rate, our numbers
are similar in magnitude to those in the previous literature. Our estimate for the
1-year rate is signicantly larger. As discussed previously, this di¤erence is due to
the fact that our estimates include the impact of the Feds short-term interest rate
monetary policy activity during the QE period.
2.5 Final Comments
This chapter proposes a new framework to analyze the price impact on the Treasury
yield curve due to a central banks bond trading activities. To test the theory, we
estimated an arbitrage-free a¢ ne term-structure model over the time period when
the Federal Reserve conducted QE program from late 2008 to the middle of 2011.
Our ndings suggest that the QE program has generated signicant price impacts
on the short to mid-term Treasury forward rates of up to 12 years. However, the
impacts on long-term rates (beyond 12 years) appear to be insignicant. Long-
term yield can still be a¤ected because yield is an geometric average of all the
future forward rates.
Our model is simplied to facilitate an analytic representation. It can be gen-
eralized to incorporate a more complex process for the large trader impact and
the term structure of interest rates. These extensions could be topics for future
research.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING ON FOREIGN
EXCHANGE RATES
The Federal Reserves quantitative easing (QE) program between 2008 and
2011 has generated signicant impact across nancial markets. Not only the bond
markets but also the currency markets have been a¤ected. In this period, the
U.S. dollar has depreciated signicantly against the Japanese yen (Figure 3.1). An
important question here is how much of the dollar depreciation can be ascribed to
QE. We attempt to address this question in this chapter.
A central monetary authority can impact the foreign exchange (FX) rates di-
rectly by trading in the currency market or indirectly by a¤ecting interest rates.
Previous studies have found that direct currency market interventions have limited
impact (see overview in Dominguez and Frankel (1993)). However, there have been
few studies to examine the indirect channel, i.e., a¤ecting FX rates by a¤ecting
interest rates. The Federal Reserves 2008-2011 QE program provides an ideal
event to study this impact channel. Over this period, the U.S. dollar depreciated
signicantly against the Japanese yen (Figure 3.1). The size of the Feds balance
sheet increased dramatically. However, the size of the Bank of Japans (BOJ)
balance sheet remained relatively stable since it had been cutting back from its
quantitative easing from 2000 to 2005 (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Due to this, one can
focus on the impact caused by the Feds activities without worrying about those
of the BOJ.
In addition to the Feds QE, there are several other possible explanations for the
signicant appreciation of the yen. The rst is a safe-haven e¤ect. There have been
persistent current account surpluses in Japan. When the nancial crisis hit the
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of USD/JPY
global economy, risk-averse investors ocked to yen-denominated assets and that
increased demand for the yen. The second argument for the yen appreciation is that
it is due to the unwinding of carry trades. At the end of 2008, the Fed lowered the
target federal funds rate to almost zero, making the yen carry trade unprotable.
As a result, investors unwound their positions, pushing up the demand for the
yen. Third, Japans economy has been signicantly a¤ected by the triple disaster
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Figure 3.2: Central BanksBalance Sheet Sizes
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Figure 3.3: Normalized Central BanksBalance Sheet Sizes
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of the earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011, and the subsequent tsunami
and nuclear plant failures. Following this three-way catastrophe, the yen began to
appreciate with the expectation of Japanese rmsrepatriation back home.
Our approach is not to try to disentangle the di¤erent impact channels stated
above. Instead, we analyze a simple model where one can pin down how impacts on
interest rates a¤ect exchange rates. The basic intuition is a no-arbitrage relation
between the interest rate markets and FX markets. For this reason, one can esti-
mate how QEs impact on interest rates a¤ects the exchange rate, without concern
about the other channels. Once this impact is quantied, the residual di¤erence
can be ascribed to the other factors. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of
the indirect channel for a central authority to a¤ect exchange rates, not its direct
intervention.
Since QE is a monetary policy tool, this dissertation expands the literature that
analyzes the impact of a central banks monetary policy on exchange rates. In this
literature, the di¢ cult aspect is the endogeneity issue. For example, a country
facing currency depreciation pressure might raise interest rates. As a result, a neg-
ative relation between interest and exchange rate movements is observed. However,
the rise in interest rates could have prevented the exchange rate falling further;
this is a positive relation. This makes it di¢ cult to assess the "true" exchange rate
response to monetary policy.
Based on the method of handling the endogeneity issue, previous works in this
body of literature can be separated into two categories. The rst adopts an event
regression approach and measures the announcement e¤ect over a very short time
window. For example, Zettelmeyer (2004) studies the impact of monetary policy
on exchange rates for Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. To
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mitigate the endogeneity issue, he analyzes rate changes over a one-day announce-
ment time window. He nds that a 1% increase in the 3-month interest rate will
appreciate the exchange rate by 2~3%. The major limitation of this approach is
that it cannot examine the cumulative impact over a longer period beyond the
announcement time window.
The other category estimates a time-series model and uses lagged variables to
mitigate the endogeneity issue. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) study the e¤ect of
U.S. monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. They apply a vector autoregression
(VAR) approach and measure the e¤ect by impulse response functions. They nd
that a contractionary shock to U.S. monetary policy leads to appreciation in the
U.S. dollar. Gould and Kamin (2001) examine the 1997 Asian nancial crisis and
analyze the e¤ect of monetary policy on exchange rates for related Asian countries.
They employ an error correction model. To overcome the endogeneity, they use
international credit spreads and domestic stock prices as instrument variables.
They do not nd signicant interest rate impacts on exchange rates.
Our approach is similar to the time-series model (the latter category). We
propose a reduced-form model by assuming a parameterized functional form for
the price impact; this can be estimated without introducing control variables.
This chapter also relates with existing studies that focus on the exchange rate
impact of a central authoritys direct currency market interventions. Dominguez
and Frankel (1993) provide a comprehensive overview. Iwata and Wu (2006)
study the e¤ectiveness of FX intervention in a zero-interest-rate environment using
Japanese data in the 1990s. They nd that FX intervention can a¤ect the exchange
rate, but the e¤ect is greatly reduced by the zero interest rate bound. Neely (2011)
studies the G7 coordinated FX intervention following Japans earthquake in March
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2011. Related work also includes Chaboud and LeBaron (2001) on the relation be-
tween trading volume in currency futures markets and the Federal Reserves FX
intervention. All the ndings tend to suggest that a central authoritys direct FX
interventions may have a strong impact in the very short term, but a long-term
e¤ect is hard to prove. Our work indicates that a long-term e¤ect does exist, but
that the impact may originate in the interest rate channel.
This chapter also complements research on the impact of QE on interest rates.
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) provide a good overview on monetary policy
tools in a zero-interest-rate environment. Jarrow and Li (2012) estimate the QE
impact on the term structure of U.S. Treasury rates. Gagnon, Raskin, Remache,
and Sack (2010) and Amico and King (2011) document that the announcements
of the Feds large-scale asset purchasing decisions lead to reductions in interest
rates. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examine di¤erent channels
through which QE a¤ects interest rates. Other related studies also include Fuster
and Willen (2010) on the QE e¤ects of purchasing mortgages; Swanson (2011) on
the 1961 Operation Twist; Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong (2010) on the QE
impacts from the Bank of England; and Hamilton and Wu (2012) on the impact
on interest rates of changing the debt maturity structure.
The studies mentioned above isolate bond markets from FX markets and none
have quantied the impact of QE on exchange rates. This dissertation lls this
gap. Our main contribution is to provide a framework to analyze the impact of
a central banks bond market intervention on the FX rate. With this framework,
we estimate that the Feds bond market intervention may have resulted in a dollar
depreciation of 7:29% against the yen during the QE period. As mentioned above,
central authorities can a¤ect exchange rates through both direct (intervene in FX
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markets) and indirect (a¤ect interest rates) channels. Our results demonstrate
that the indirect channel is very important, especially in a period when a central
bank conducts massive bond purchases.
Krugman (1991) proposes a valuable model for target-zone exchange rate man-
agement. In his paper, the governments intervention is modeled as boundary con-
ditions for exchange rate dynamics. This assumption has limitations in currency
pairs such as USD/JPY because there are no specic policy bands. Therefore,
we assume a di¤erent approach and introduce a hypothetical exchange rate in the
absence of intervention. The impact of a governments intervention is modeled as
the di¤erence between the hypothetical and the observed rate.
This work is also related with Jarrow and Protter (2005) who study potential
arbitrage opportunities caused by large tradersimpact on the price process. In
the QE case, when the Fed (the larger trader) announces the commencement of
QE, there can be potential arbitrage opportunities for small traders. Jarrow and
Li (2012) show that QE does not generate arbitrage opportunities in the Treasury
markets. This chapter does not discuss whether QE generates arbitrage opportu-
nities in the currency markets. Instead, we assume no-arbitrage holds and rely on
this to link the impact on interest rates with that on FX rates.
3.1 The Model
Central authorities can a¤ect exchange rates through two channels. They can
intervene in currency markets directly, or generate the impact by a¤ecting interest
rates. In this section, we derive relations between the impacts on interest and
foreign exchange rates, where the interest rate impact is a result of the central
banks trading in government bonds. The theory consists of two parts. The rst
55
one studies the impact of QE on interest rates while the second studies how the
impact on interest rates is reected in foreign exchange rates.
3.1.1 QEs Impact on the U.S. Treasury Rates
Consider an economy where traded assets are default-free zero-coupon bonds of
all maturities and a money market account. The asset market is frictionless (no
transaction costs, no restrictions on trade, asset prices are perfectly divisible).
The Fed is a large trader and its trades have price impacts. In addition, the Feds
announcement of QE a¤ects other participants in the economy and could change
the aggregate demand for di¤erent securities.
The time-t cumulative changes in the aggregate demand for the T -maturity
zero-coupon bond can be written as
x(t; T ) = y(t; T ) + z(t; T )
where y(t; T ) is the time-t cumulative changes in the Feds holdings of the T -
maturity zero-coupon bond due to its purchases, and z(t; T ) is the time-t cumu-
lative changes in the market demand for the T -maturity zero-coupon bond due to
the Feds QE announcements.
Since knowing the price of a zero-coupon bond is equivalent to knowing the
forward rate of the same maturity, we assume the QE announcement and the
Feds trading afterwards a¤ect the observed forward rates as follows:
df(t; T ) = df 0(t; T ) + (t; T )(f 0(t; T )  f(t; T ))dt  d	(t; T ) (3.1)
where f(t; T ) (f 0(t; T )) denotes the forward rate with (without) the QE impact, and
d	(t; T ) represents the price impact due to changes in aggregate demand x(t; T ).
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In particular, d	(t; T )  g(x(t; T ); T )dx(t; T ), where g(x(t; T ); T ) corresponds to
the marginal impact of the change in aggregate demand dx(t; T ) on the observed
forward rate.
The motivation for Eqn. (3.1) is that one can decompose the observed forward
rate movement df(t; T ) into three components: the rst is the movement of the
true forward rate df 0(t; T ) in the absence of QE, the second is a mean-reversion
around the true rate, and the third is the price impact due to QE. (t; T ) measures
the speed of mean reversion and d	(t; T ) measures the marginal price impact.
Solving the di¤erential equation (3.1) leads to
f(t; T ) = f 0(t; T ) 
Z t
0
e 
R t
s (u;T )dud	(s; T ): (3.2)
The intuition now becomes more clear. The observed forward rate f(t; T ) can be
decomposed into two components: one is the true forward rate f 0(t; T ) to which
the observed rate mean reverts. The other is the price impact due to the Feds
activities, which depends on the rate of mean reversion (t; T ) and the marginal
impact d	(t; T ) due to changes in aggregate demand. Up to this point, (t; T )
and 	(t; T ) can be very general stochastic processes.
Although the Feds holdings y(t; T ) are observable, the cumulative changes in
market demand z(t; T ) are not. Consequently, x(t; T ) is not observable. Because
of this, we will not be able to estimate g(x(s; T ); T ) and x(s; T ) separately. This
explains why the simplied notation in expression (2.4) is used above.
For tractability, we assume that the Fed buys the securities only up to time
 . The rate of mean reversion and the marginal impact on forward rates are both
deterministic functions that only depend on the rates maturity T . Analytically,
we assume that d	(t; T ) = Iftg (T )dt, (t; T ) = (T ), where Ifg is an indicator
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function. Then the forward rates can be written as:
f(t; T ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
f(0; T ) , if t = 0
f 0(t; T )   (T )
(T )
(1  e (T )t), if 0 < t  
f 0(t; T )   (T )
(T )
(e(T )   1)e (T )t, if t > :
(3.3)
In particular, the spot rate can be written as:
rt =
8>>>><>>>>:
r0, if t = 0
r0t    (0)(0) (1  e (0)t), if 0 < t  
r0t    (0)(0) (e(0)   1)e (0)t, if t > :
(3.4)
3.1.2 Simultaneous Impacts on Interest and Foreign Ex-
change Rates
Consider a world where both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan a¤ect the
spot interest rates of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen by buying respective
government bonds. Traded assets are default-free zero-coupon bonds of all matu-
rities and money market accounts (mma) denominated in the dollar and yen. The
Fed keeps buying until time  d, while the BOJ keeps buying until time  y. The
other traders act as price takers.
From Eqn. (3.4), the relation for U.S. dollar spot rates can be written as:
rd;t =
8><>: r
0
d;t    dd (1  e dt), if t   d
r0d;t    dd (ed   1)e dt, if t >  d
where the rst term r0d;t is the hypothetical spot rate if the Fed did not conduct
QE and the second term is the price impact due to QE. rd;t is the realized spot
rate in the presence of QE.
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Similarly, for yen spot rates:
ry;t =
8><>: r
0
y;t    yy (1  e yt), if t   y
r0y;t    yy (ey   1)e yt, if t >  y:
Therefore, the value of a dollar denominated mma evolves as
Bt = exp
Z t
0
rd;sds

=
8><>: B
0
t exp
n
  d
d
t+  d
2d
(1  e dt)
o
, if t   d
B0t exp
n
  d
d
 d +
 d
2d
(edd   1)e dt
o
, if t >  d
where B0t is the mma value without the central banks impact.
Similarly, the value of a yen denominated mma evolves as
bBt = expZ t
0
ry;sds

=
8><>:
bB0t expn  yy t+  y2y (1  e yt)o , if t   ybB0t expn  yy  y +  y2y (eyy   1)e yto , if t >  y:
Since lim
t!1
Bt = B
0
t exp
n
  d
d
 d
o
, lim
t!1
bBt = bB0t expn  yy  yo, the impact on the
price of mma does not decay to zero eventually.
For convenience, dene
Z(t; ; ; ) 
8><>: exp
  

t+  
2
(1  e t)	 , if t  
exp
  

 +  
2
(e   1)e t	 , if t > :
Denote Yt as the spot exchange rate of yen per dollar. We assume there are
no arbitrage opportunities from trading the mma, hence there exists an equivalent
local martingale measure Q under which
bBt=Yt
Bt
is a Q-local martingale. The no-
arbitrage relation implies bBt=Yt
Bt
= EQt
 bBT=YT
BT
Ft
!
(3.5)
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where T is a very long time period from time t, Ft is the natural ltration up to
time t. With the central banksimpact, the "distorted" price of the dollar value
of the yen mma is
bBt
Yt
= EQt
 bBT=YT
BT
Ft
!
Bt
= EQt
 bB0TZ(T ; y; y;  y)=YT
B0TZ(T ; d; d;  d)
Ft
!
B0tZ(t; d; d;  d)
= EQt
 bB0T=YT
B0T
Ft
!
B0tZ(t; d; d;  d) 
Z(T ; y; y;  y)
Z(T ; d; d;  d)
(3.6)
Eqn. (3.6) holds because the Z() functions are deterministic and can be moved
out of the expectation.
Theorem 2 Under the above framework, the central banks impact on the ex-
change rate is
Y 0t
Yt
=
Z(t; d; d;  d)
Z(t; y; y;  y)
exp

 d
d
 d  
 y
y
 y

e u(t) (3.7)
where Yt(Y 0t ) is the spot exchange rate of yen per dollar with (without) the central
banks impact;  d; d ( y; y) are impact parameters on the dollar (yen) interest
rates; e u(t) represents the exchange rate impact through other channels.
The proof is o¤ered in the appendix. The no-arbitrage relation (Eqn. (3.5))
is a key assumption in this chapter. Considering the large trading volume in the
xed income and exchange rate markets, it is reasonable to assume that there are
no long-lasting arbitrage opportunities in these markets. The no-arbitrage relation
is related to the uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP), but is weaker. It is weaker
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because UIP, as distinct from IP, involves equilibrium risk premium. There are
numerous studies testing UIP (see, for instance, Fama (1984); Bekaert and Hodrick
(1993); Engel (1996); Flood and Rose (1996); Bansal (1997); Bakshi and Naka
(1997); Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Nissen (1998); Backus, Foresi, and Telmer
(2001); Chinn and Meredith (2005); Brennan and Xia (2006); Bekaert, Wei, and
Xing (2007); Lothian and Wu (2011)). The evidence is mixed. Violations of UIP
could be due to actual violations, small sample bias, or the poor estimation of risk
premium.
Dene yt = lnYt, y0t = lnY
0
t . Eqn. (3.7) can be written as
yt   y0t = lnZ(t; y; y;  y)  lnZ(t; d; d;  d) +
 y
y
 y    d
d
 d + u(t) (3.8)
Eqn. (3.7) shows that the central banks impact on exchange rates can be
decomposed into two parts. One is an impact through interest rates:
Z(t; d; d;  d)
Z(t; y; y;  y)
exp

 d
d
 d  
 y
y
 y

;
and the rest is represented by e u(t). u(t) includes the impact from other factors
such as the direct foreign exchange intervention and ight to quality during the
sample period. In particular, we assume
du(t) = dq(t) + t(y
0
t   yt)dt
where the rst term dq(t) represents the impact from direct FX market interven-
tion, and the second term t(y0t   yt)dt represents other e¤ects such as ight to
quality. The other e¤ects are measured as a proportion of the total impact. A
detailed analysis about u(t) is given later in the chapter.
As a reality check, one can see that when the Feds U.S. bond purchasing
activities dominate (Z(t; d; d;  d) > Z(t; y; y;  y) or
 d
d
 d >
 y
y
 y ), the dollar
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depreciates (Yt < Y 0t ) relative to the case when there is no central banksimpact.
When the BOJs yen bond purchasing activities dominates, the dollar appreciates
(Yt > Y 0t ). The degree of depreciation (appreciation) depends on respective impact
functions.
Substituting the expressions for Z(t; d; d;  d) and Z(t; y; y;  y) into Eqn.
(3.8) , one obtains
yt   y0t =

 d
d
   y
y

t+
h
 y
2y
(1  e yt)   d
2d
(1  e dt)
i
+
 y
y
 y    dd  d + u(t), if t  min( d;  y)
yt   y0t =
h
 y
2y
(ey   1)e yt    d
2d
(ed   1)e dt
i
+u(t), if t  max( d;  y):
(3.9)
3.2 Data
We examine the USD/JPY currency pair during the Federal Reserves QE period.
The exchange rate data is the daily USD/JPY rate obtained from Bloomberg.
The sample period spans from December 15, 2008 to July 15, 2011. It starts at
the beginning of QE1 and ends at the termination of QE2. Panel A of Table 3.1
presents summary statistics of the exchange rates.
The interest rate data are the daily instantaneous U.S. Treasury forward rates
constructed by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (GSW (2007)) and are available on
the Federal Reserve website.1 We choose this dataset for easy comparison with
the existing literature. In the following sections, we estimate a three-factor term
structure model using a Kalman lter. Therefore, four time-series of forward rates
1https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm
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Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
-0.00017 0.007 0.13 5.23
Panel A: USD/JPY
Maturity
(year)
Mean
(%) Std Skewness Kurtosis
1 0.6905 0.2681 0.0960 2.2091
2 1.5868 0.4574 -0.1643 2.2404
3 2.5479 0.5509 -0.3361 2.1781
4 3.4133 0.5764 -0.4297 2.1876
Panel B: GSW Forward Rates
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
are enough to estimate a three-factor model. The input data are the 1-year, 2-year,
3-year and 4-year GSW forward rates spanning from December 15, 2008 to July
15, 2011. The forward rates are plotted in Figure 3.4 and the summary statistics
are presented in Panel B of Table 3.1.
The balance sheet data for BOJ and the Fed are downloaded from their respec-
tive websites.2 Japans Ministry of Finance website provides data about their direct
currency market interventions. The quarterly reports of Treasury and Federal Re-
serve foreign exchange operations provide data on direct currency interventions by
the U.S. monetary authorities.
2The Bank of Japans balance sheet: http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/boj/other/acmai/index.htm/
The Federal Reserves balance sheet: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/
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Figure 3.4: GSW Forward Rates
3.3 Estimation
Since the BOJ did not conduct massive asset purchases over this period (see Figures
3.2 and 3.3), we believe the assumption  y = 0 is a good approximation and
expression (3.9) can be simplied as
yt   y0t =  dd t 
 d
2d
(1  e dt)   d
d
 d + u(t), if t   d
yt   y0t =   d2d (e
dd   1)e dt + u(t), if t >  d:
(3.10)
Dene
v(t) =
 d
d
t   d
2d
(1  e dt)   d
d
 d (3.11)
v(t) measures the impact due to QE.
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Following Jarrow and Li (2012), we estimate the impact parameters  d and d
using a three-factor a¢ ne term structure model (Vasicek (1977)). In a three-factor
a¢ ne model, the short rate is the sum of three factors.
r(t) =
3X
n=1
zn(t):
Each factor zn(t) evolves as
dzn(t) = kn(n   zn(t))dt+ ndWn(t)
where Wn(t) for n = 1; 2; 3 are independent standard Wiener processes.
This evolution allows the spot rate to be negative with positive probability.
Although alternative evolutions could be used to preclude negative rates, both
economic theory and the empirical evidence are more consistent with evolutions
that allow negative (nominal) rates with positive probability. Indeed, from a the-
oretical perspective, large nancial institutions cannot store currency; they can
only invest it in either deposits or securities; and consequently, negative rates are
possible. Empirically, negative rates on Treasuries were observed in each of No-
vember 2009, June 2011, and August 2011;3 negative yield on German government
bond was observed in July 2012;4 and the Bank of New York Mellon paid negative
deposit rates in August 2011.5
Since the spot rate is unobservable, we estimate the model using a Kalman
lter. The measurement equation is
f(t;i) = Ai +
3X
n=1
Bi;nzn(t) + w(t;i) (3.12)
3See WSJ Blog, Market Beat, November 20, 2009, "Some Treasury Bill Rates Negative Again
Friday;" Bloomberg, November 19, 2009, "U.S. 3-month Bills Turn Negative on Concern Risk
Rally Overdone;" Bloomberg, June 27, 2011, "Treasury 4-week Bill Rates Negative for First Time
since 2010;" WSJ Blog, Market Beat, August 4, 2011, "From One Crisis to Another: One Month
T-Bill Yields go Negative Again."
4See Online WSJ, July 18, 2012, "Negative Yield on German 2-Year Note."
5See Bloomberg.com/news, August 5, 2011, "BNY Mellon Makes Clients Pay for Deposits as
Investors Seek Safety in Cash;" Online WSJ, August 5, 2011, "New Fee to Bank Cash."
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where w(t;i) are assumed to follow independent normal distributions.
Bi;n = e
 kni, i = Ti   t:
For 0 < t   d,
Ai =
3X
n=1
n

1  e kni   i
i
(1  e it):
The time-discretized state transition equation can be written as
zn(t+t) = n(1  e knt) + e kntzn(t) + "n(t) n = 1; 2; 3 (3.13)
where "n(t) follow zero-mean normal distributions with the following variance and
covariance
V ar ["n(t)jFt t] = 
2
n
2kn
 
1  e 2knt
Cov["n(t); "m(t)jFt t] = 0 n 6= m
where Ft is the natural ltration generated by the state variables process up to
time t.
Since it is a three-factor model, it can be identied as long as there are more
than three time-series of input forward rates. Thus, we use the 1-year, 2-year,
3-year and 4-year GSW forward rates spanning the QE period. The estimation
results are listed in Table 3.2. Since the instantaneous spot rate is unobservable,
we use the impact parameters on the one-year rate as an approximation: d =
1 = 2:22,  d =  1 = 0:1. Plugging the numbers into the right hand side of
Expression (3.11), one obtains the time series of v(t), which is the impact of QE
and is graphed as the dashed curve in Figure 3.5. The dotted curve plots the
observed exchange rate evolution (yt).
Figure 3.5 shows that QE leads to a depreciation of the dollar. If QE was not
conducted, the dollar value could have been higher. Over the sample period, the
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Parameter Estimate Std Estimate Std
θ1 0.02 0.82 0.024 14.4
θ2 0.022 0.81 0.052 4.4
θ3 0.025 0.81 0.009 10.3
k1 0.11 0.009 0.14 0.02
k2 0.11 0.038 0.14 0.09
k3 0.59 0.067 0.10 1.69
σ1 0.0121 0.0006 0.0114 0.0023
σ2 0.0036 0.0008 0.0021 0.0072
σ3 0.0001 0.0017 0.0001 0.0014
λ1 2.22 0.21
λ2 1.77 0.19
λ3 1.30 0.17
λ4 0.82 0.20
ψ1 0.10 0.01
ψ2 0.07 0.01
ψ3 0.04 0.008
ψ4 0.02 0.007
lnL
With Impact Without Impact
11235 11127
Table 3.2: Three-factor Parameter Estimates
average value of v(t) is  7:29%. Our interpretation is that the Feds QE resulted
in a 7:29% depreciation of the dollar on average.
3.4 Impact Due to Other Factors
The Feds QE is not the only factor to a¤ect the dollar/yen exchange rate over
the sample period. For instance, during the 2007-2009 global nancial crisis, many
risk-averse investors ocked to U.S. assets. This safe-haven e¤ect can cause the
dollar to appreciate. In addition, direct FX intervention by the central authority
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Figure 3.5: QE Impact on USD/JPY
could also have an impact. In this section, we propose a reduced-form approach to
estimate the net e¤ect due to factors other than QE. It has been denoted as u(t)
in the theory model.
3.4.1 The Derivation
Eqn. (3.10) leads to
dyt   dy0t =
 d
d
(1  e dt)dt+ du(t), if t   d: (3.14)
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As discussed in Section 2, we assume
du(t) = t(y
0
t   yt)dt+ dq(t)
where dq(t) represents the impact from direct FX market intervention. t(y0t yt)dt
represents the impact from other factors such as the safe-haven e¤ect mentioned
above. Eqn. (3.14) can be written as
dyt = dy
0
t +
 d
d
(1  e dt)dt+ t(y0t   yt)dt+ dq(t): (3.15)
Previous studies have found that direct currency market interventions have a
short-lived impact, especially sterilized interventions (see Dominguez and Frankel
(1993)). As an approximation, we assume dq(t) = 0.
Assuming y0 = y00, the solution to Eqn. (3.15) is:
yt = y
0
t +
Z t
0
e 
R t
s udu
 d
d
(1  e ds)ds:
For simplicity, assuming the parameters to be constant: t = ,  t =  , one has
yt = y
0
t +
 d=d

(1  e t)   d=d
  d (e
 dt   e t); t   d (3.16)
It is worth noting that Eqn. (3.16) is consistent with the assumption that
y0 = y
0
0.
Combining Eqn. (3.10) and (3.16) leads to
u(t) =
 d=d

(1  e t)   d=d
  d (e
 dt   e t) 

 d
d
t   d
2d
(1  e dt)   d
d
 d

(3.17)
for t   d.
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3.4.2 Estimation
To estimate the impact parameter , one needs to assume an underlying process for
the "true" exchange rate y0t. We assume y
0
t follows a geometric Brownian motion
(GBM):
dy0t = dt+ dWt
where Wt is a Wiener process Wt  N(0; t):Then
y0t = y
0
0 + t+ Wt
The GBM assumption is made for two reasons. First, it is easy to estimate and
avoids the problem of overtting. Second, it is a widely-adopted assumption in
studying currency options (for empirical work see Shastri and Tandon (1986),
Hilliard, Madura and Tucker (1991); for theoretical work see Biger and Hull (1983),
Amin and Jarrow (1991)).
Since y00 = y0, Eqn. (3.16) can be written as
yt = y0 + t+ Wt +
 d=d

(1  e t)   d=d
  d (e
 dt   e t), if t   d (3.18)
which leads to the following distribution for yt:
yt  N

y0 + t+
 d=d

(1  e t)   d=d
  d (e
 dt   e t); 2t

The impact parameter  can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method.
The estimation results are listed in Panel B of Table 3.3:  =  0:0229,  = 3:94.
The negative sign of  implies that the true exchange rate y0t has a depreciating
trend over the sample period. A positive and signicant  suggests that there
are other factors supporting the dollar. It is noteworthy that  > d: In the
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Estimate Std
λd 2.22 0.21
ψd 0.1 0.01
μ -0.0229 0.0002
λ 3.94 0.07
Panel A
Panel B
lnL1 = -53907
BIC = 107827
Table 3.3: Impact Model Estimation
absence of these factors, the dollar could have depreciated more over the sample
period. One possible explanation could be a safe-haven e¤ect in the dollar, which
refers to the phenomenon that risk-averse investors ocked to U.S. assets during
the 2007-2009 global nancial crisis. The total impact (yt   y0t) (Eqn. (3.16))
and the safe-haven e¤ect u(t) (Eqn. (3.17)) can be computed using the estimated
parameters. Figure 3.6 provides a decomposition of the total impact. The average
total impact (yt   y0t) is 0:84%. This slightly positive value can be interpreted as
the result of a combination of a negative QE impact ( 7:29% on average) and a
positive safe-haven e¤ect (8:13% on average).
To further understand the intuition behind the results, one can write
yt   y0 = v(t) + u(t) + (y0t   y00) (3.19)
where yt   y0 is the the observed dollar depreciation, v(t) is the QE impact, u(t)
is the safe-haven e¤ect and y0t   y00 is the unobserved true rate depreciation.
Rewriting Eqn. (3.19) gives
1 =
v(t)
yt   y0 +
u(t)
yt   y0 +
y0t   y00
yt   y0 (3.20)
With the help of Eqn. (3.20), the interpretation becomes more clear. The esti-
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Figure 3.6: Impact Decomposition
mation results show that, the QE impact (the rst term) can explain 62% of the
observed total dollar depreciation. Meanwhile, there is a safe-haven e¤ect (the sec-
ond term) that causes a dollar appreciation. The magnitude is about 69% of the
total dollar depreciation but the sign is the opposite. In addition, the unobserved
true dollar value depreciated 7% more than the observed dollar depreciation (the
last term). This decomposition is also shown in Figure 3.6.
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3.5 Robustness Checks
To show that the model described by Eqn. (3.18) is able to measure the impact of
QE, we conduct two parts in the robustness check. The rst part is related with
interest rate dynamics and the second is related with exchange rate dynamics.
3.5.1 Interest Rate Dynamics
In this section, we try to show that Eqn. (3.12) and (3.13) is able to capture QEs
impact on interest rates. The endogeneity issue mentioned in the introduction
largely resides here. Once people are convinced that the model is able to capture
the QE impact on interest rates, then the impact on the exchange rate is an
equilibrium result derived from a no-arbitrage condition.
To show that the impact parameters indeed do measure the QE impact, we
estimate the model using two other sample periods when QE was absent. One
ranges from January 2, 2001 to August 1, 2003 when the Fed lowered interest
rates. The other period spans from January 2, 2004 to August 1, 2006 when the
Fed raised interest rates. The input data are the 1-year, 2-year, 3-year and 4-year
GSW(2007) forward rates. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 list the estimation results. In Table
3.4, only the impact parameters on the one-year forward rate are signicant. In
Table 3.5, even though the duration parameter () is signicant for the two- and
three-year rates, the magnitude parameter ( ) is not. Also, the impact parameters
on the one-year rate are not signicant. These results suggest that the model does
not provide a good t for periods when there is no QE. In contrast, all the impact
parameters are strongly signicant for the QE period (see Table 3.2). These results
support that the model is able to measure the impact of QE on interest rates.
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Parameter Estimate Std Estimate Std
θ1 0.021 0.82 0.023 0.82
θ2 0.020 0.82 0.029 0.82
θ3 0.022 0.82 0.024 0.82
k1 0.59 0.31 0.26 0.15
k2 0.28 0.06 0.25 0.02
k3 0.28 0.12 0.25 0.03
σ1 0.0001 0.015 0.005 0.009
σ2 0.032 0.009 0.026 0.005
σ3 0.016 0.007 0.021 0.005
λ1 1.35 0.62
λ2 0.75 0.64
λ3 0.35 0.71
λ4 0.00 0.90
ψ1 0.071 0.023
ψ2 0.035 0.015
ψ3 0.017 0.011
ψ4 0.008 0.008
lnL
With Impact Without Impact
9563 9508
Table 3.4: Robustness Check: Jan. 2, 2001 - Aug. 1, 2003
As a comparison, Tables 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 also list the estimation results for a
model without the price impact term. The bottom row provides the maximized
log-likelihood value and a likelihood ratio test is conducted. The test statistic is
2(ln(L1)  ln(L2)), where L1 (L2) is the maximized likelihood value with (without)
the price impact term.
At the 5% signicance level, the likelihood ratio test rejects the model without
the price impact for all three sample periods. This is to be expected since it is an
in sample test, and the price impact model has more parameters. More insightful
is a comparison of the magnitudes of the changes in the likelihood values over
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Parameter Estimate Std Estimate Std
θ1 0.006 0.94 0.020 0.82
θ2 0.071 1.25 0.022 0.82
θ3 0.009 0.95 0.018 0.82
k1 0.45 0.08 0.98 0.06
k2 0.21 0.02 0.20 0.03
k3 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.03
σ1 0.0001 0.005 0.069 0.007
σ2 0.019 0.003 0.015 0.002
σ3 0.012 0.005 0.013 0.003
λ1 0.87 0.38
λ2 1.59 0.31
λ3 1.11 0.21
λ4 1.20 0.16
ψ1 -0.010 0.007
ψ2 0.0006 0.007
ψ3 0.010 0.005
ψ4 0.018 0.004
lnL 10738 10698
With Impact Without Impact
Table 3.5: Robustness Check: Jan. 2, 2004 - Aug. 1, 2006
the di¤erent sample periods. For the 1/2/2001-8/1/2003 sample (no QE), the log-
likelihood increases by 0.6% after adding the price impact term. For the 1/2/2004-
8/1/2006 (no QE) sample period, the increase is only 0.4%. In contrast, for the
QE period, the log-likelihood increases the most, by 1%, after adding the price
impact term. These relative changes in the likelihood ratio tests are consistent
with the validity of the model.
We also compute pricing errors for an a¢ ne model with and without the Feds
price impact term. The results are listed in Table 3.6. It shows that the model with
a price impact term generates much smaller pricing errors. This lends additional
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Maturity
(year)
Mean
(bp) SE t Skew Kurt ρ(1) ρ(10) ρ(20)
1 -1.61 0.56 -2.87 0.23 2.71 0.88 0.57 0.31
2 -2.17 0.73 -2.99 0.37 2.62 0.88 0.51 0.25
3 -1.84 1.07 -1.71 -0.23 2.64 0.94 0.71 0.50
4 -0.51 1.29 -0.40 -0.63 2.88 0.95 0.77 0.58
Panel A (With the price impact term)
Maturity
(year)
Mean
(bp) SE t Skew Kurt ρ(1) ρ(10) ρ(20)
1 -4.34 0.71 -6.14 0.32 2.33 0.93 0.69 0.49
2 -15.34 0.84 -18.19 0.36 3.07 0.91 0.56 0.29
3 -5.90 1.31 -4.51 -0.16 2.32 0.96 0.76 0.57
4 5.96 1.53 3.88 -0.35 2.25 0.97 0.81 0.64
Panel B (Without the price impact term)
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics of Pricing Errors
support to the methodology.
Another concern is that the GSW forward rates are generated by a smooth-
ing method that assumes a parametric model with six parameters (see Svensson
(1994)). This special smoothing method may cause biases. To address this issue,
we estimate the model using forward rates based on a polynomial spline smoothing
procedure. The results are very similar.
3.5.2 Foreign Exchange Dynamics
The following subsections address two issues. First, over the QE period, one should
expect Eqn. (3.18) (call it the "impact model") to outperform a simple model
without the price impact term. Second, one needs to rule out the e¤ect of direct
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Estimate Std
μ -0.017 0.0002
lnL2 = -55970
BIC = 111947
Table 3.7: GBM Model Estimation
FX market interventions.
QE v.s. Non-QE Period
In this subsection, we rst show that the impact model provides a better t than
a simple geometric Brownian motion (GBM) model for the QE period. Second,
we show that the simple GBM model performs better in a non-QE period than in
a QE one.
If one imposes  d = 0, then the impact model becomes the GBM model.
We estimate the GBM model using maximum likelihood for the QE period. The
results are listed in Table 3.7. The new drift parameter  =  0:017 is signicantly
di¤erent from the one estimated with the impact model.
The impact model has two free parameters ( and ) while the GBM model
has one free parameter (). To discover which one provides a better t for the QE
period, we conduct a likelihood-ratio test to compare them. The test statistic is
2(ln(L1)   ln(L2)), where L1 and L2 are the corresponding likelihood functions.
Since the di¤erence in free parameters is 1, the test statistic should follow a 2
distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The values of ln(L1) and ln(L2) are listed
in Table 3.3 and 3.7. For the 2(1) distribution, the 1% p-value corresponds to a
critical value of 6:6. The calculation shows that 2(ln(L1)  ln(L2)) = 4126, which
is far greater than the critical value. Therefore, the likelihood ratio test suggests
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that the impact model ts the data much better than the GBM model does for
the QE period.
To provide further support, we also adopt the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) (Schwarz (1978)) to compare the two models. The BIC criterion is dened
as
BIC =  2 ln(L) + k ln(N)
where L is the maximized likelihood function, k is the number of free parameters
and N is the sample size. The smaller the BIC value, the better the model.
The BIC values are listed in Tables 3.3 and 3.7. The BIC increases by about
4% as one moves from the GBM to the impact model. This is additional evidence
to favor the impact model.
Furthermore, one should expect the simple GBM model to perform better in a
non-QE period than in a QE period. Therefore, we conduct the estimation using
another time-series with no QE. The time period spans from June 30, 2006 to July
15, 2008 and includes 533 business days. Call it "control period". In this period,
both the Fed and the BOJ did not conduct QE. To match the control period, we
truncate the main sample period to range from December 15, 2008 to December
29, 2010 so that it also contains 533 business days. We estimate the GBM model
for both periods by minimizing the following objective function:
f() =
533X
t=1
[yt   (y0 + t)]2
2t
where  = 1=250.
The results are listed in Table 3.8. One can see that the minimized objec-
tive function for the control period is fC() = 41939 while for the QE period is
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Estimate Std
μ -0.0031 0.0002
Obj. function 41939
Jun. 30, 2006 Jul. 15, 2008
Estimate Std
μ -0.0009 0.0002
Obj. function 50856
Dec. 15, 2008 Dec. 29, 2010
Table 3.8: QE v.s. Non-QE Period
fQE() = 50856. The fact that fC() is about 18% lower than fQE() suggests
that the simple GBM model is a better t for a non-QE period.
The Impact of Direct Interventions
In Figure 3.7, one can see that there are two direct intervention days during this
sample period. On September 15, 2010, Japans monetary authorities sold yen and
bought dollars to weaken the yen and protect its exporters. On March 18, 2011,
both the Japanese and U.S. monetary authorities intervened in the FX markets
following Japans triple disasters. This intervention successfully resulted in a de-
preciation of the yen by 3~4% within hours. Neely (2011) studies the latter episode
and argues that the direct intervention has an immediate short-term impact, while
a long-term e¤ect is hard to identify.
As another robustness check, we show that the exchange rate impact measured
above cannot be ascribed to direct FX interventions. To achieve this, we exclude
the direct intervention days over the QE period and re-estimate the model. The
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Figure 3.7: Direct FX Interventions
results are listed in Table 9. The top panel is estimated with the full sample; the
middle panel is estimated with data excluding direct intervention days; and the
bottom panel is estimated with data excluding three days around the intervention
days. After accounting for estimation errors, the parameter estimates are almost
the same. This suggests that the model does indeed measure the e¤ect due to QE
instead of direct exchange interventions, hence the assumption dq(t) = 0 presented
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Estimate Std
μ -0.0229 0.0002
λ 3.94 0.07
μ -0.0228 0.0002
λ 3.95 0.07
μ -0.0227 0.0002
λ 3.97 0.07
Full sample
Excluding intervention days
Excluding 3 days around intervention days
Table 3.9: Impact Model Estimation Excluding Direct Intervention Days
in Section 5 is a good approximation.
To summarize, the above robustness checks demonstrate that the impact model
is able to capture the e¤ect of the Feds QE on the USD/JPY exchange rate.
3.6 Final Remarks
This chapter provides a framework to study the impact of a central banks bond
market intervention on foreign exchange rates. The key assumption is a no-
arbitrage relationship between the interest rates and foreign exchange markets.
With this framework, we estimate the impact of the Federal Reserves 2008 - 2011
QE program on the USD/JPY exchange rate. We nd that the Feds QE can
explain about 62% of the total dollar depreciation during this period. The im-
plication is that a central banks bond market intervention might have signicant
impact on foreign exchange rates.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation provides a new framework for analyzing the impact of the
Federal Reserves quantitative easing (QE) on the Treasury yield curve and foreign
exchange rates. To test our theory, we estimated an arbitrage-free a¢ ne model
that includes the price impact of a large trader, the Fed, over the time period
when the Fed conducted its QE program: late 2008 to the middle of 2011. Our
ndings indicate that the QE program generated signicant price impacts on short-
and medium- term Treasury forward rates of up to 12 years without introducing
arbitrage opportunities into the markets. In contrast to the Feds stated intentions,
however, the impact on long-term forward rates appears to have been insignicant.
The half-life of the forward rate impacts increased with the maturity of the forward
rate up to approximately 6 years, and then declined thereafter. The largest half-
life estimated is approximately 1.4 years in duration. Since yields are averages of
forward rates, QE did have an impact on long-term bond yields. Our estimates
of the magnitude of the QE yield changes are similar to those that appear in the
existing literature.
The model estimated herein was simplied in order to facilitate an analytic
representation and the use of maximum likelihood estimation procedures. As such,
the model can and should be generalized to explore its empirical validity. Two
immediate extensions are to have a more complex large trader impact process and
a more complex evolution for the term structure of interest rates.
We also extend the framework to analyze the impact of a central banks bond
market intervention on foreign exchange rates. With this framework, we estimate
the impact of the Federal Reserves 2008 - 2011 QE program on the USD/JPY
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exchange rate. The advantage of studying this event is that both the U.S. and
Japanese government did not conduct much direct intervention in the currency
markets at that time, and only the Federal Reserve conducted signicant bond
purchasing activities. Over this sample period, the observed cumulative dollar
depreciation is about 11:70%. We nd that the Feds QE may have resulted in
a depreciation of the dollar by 7:29% during this period. That accounts for 62%
of the total depreciation. The policy implication is that, when a central bank
intervenes in the interest rate market by trading a large volume of bonds, it should
consider the impact on the exchange rate, which could be very large.
Since the Feds QE is not the sole factor to a¤ect the exchange rate, we propose
a reduced-form approach to estimate the net e¤ect due to other factors. Our
estimation results suggest that some other factors supported the dollar over the
sample period, o¤setting the QE impact. Interestingly, we nd that the net impact
is slightly positive after combining all factors. The average net impact is about a
0:84% appreciation of the dollar. Our explanation of this result is that a ight-to-
quality safe-haven e¤ect was very strong during the sample period.
Broadly speaking, there are two channels through which a central monetary
authority can a¤ect exchange rates: one is direct intervention in the FX markets;
the other is to a¤ect exchange rates through interest rates. This dissertation
shows that the second channel lasts longer than the rst one, and that the impact
magnitude can be very large.
Some extensions would be valuable following our studies. One extension is to
apply this framework to di¤erent episodes and di¤erent currency pairs. It can be
used to study the case in which two central banks conduct QE simultaneously.
Another extension is to introduce more complex models for exchange rates move-
83
ments. These extensions await subsequent research.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1:
From expression (2.11), for t   , we have
dF (t; T ) = ((t; T )   (T )e (T )t)dt+
NX
n=1
n(t; T )dWn(t)
The HJM condition on f(t; T ) implies that
(t; T ) =  
NX
n=1
n(t; T )

n(t) 
Z T
t
n(t; s)ds

(A.1)
The HJM condition on F (t; T ) implies that
(t; T )   (T )e (T )t =  
NX
n=1
n(t; T )

n(t) 
Z T
t
n(t; s)ds

(A.2)
where i(t) (i(t)) is the price of risk for factor i with (without) the Feds price
impact.
From expression. (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain the di¤erence in risk premium:
NX
n=1
n(t; T )[n(t)  n(t)] =  (T )e (T )t > 0
From expression (2.11), for t >  , we have
dF (t; T ) = [(t; T ) +  (T )(e(T )   1)e (T )t]dt+
NX
n=1
n(t; T )dWn(t)
The HJM condition on F (t; T ) implies that
(t; T ) +  (T )(e(T )   1)e (T )t =  
NX
n=1
n(t; T )

n(t) 
Z T
t
n(t; s)ds

(A.3)
From expressions (A.1) and (A.3), we obtain the di¤erence in risk premium:
NX
n=1
n(t; T )[n(t)  n(t)] =  (T )(1  e(T ) )e (T )t < 0
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To sum up, the Feds impact on the risk premium is
NX
n=1
n(t; T )[n(t)  n(t)] =
8><>:  (T )e
 (T )t, if t  
 (T )(1  e(T ) )e (T )t, if t > 
In the special case of a one-factor model, we have
(t)  (t) =
8><>:
 (T )e (T )t
(t;T )
, if t  
 (T )(1 e(T ) )e (T )t
(t;T )
, if t > 
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let T be the stopping time when either the U.S. or Japan "matures". We
assume there are no arbitrage opportunities from trading the mma, hence there
exists an equivalent local martingale measure Q under which
bBt=Yt
Bt
is a Q-local
martingale. With the central banks impact, the "distorted" price of the dollar
value of the yen mma isbBt
Yt
= EQt
 bBT=YT
BT
Ft
!
Bt
= EQt
 bB0TZ(T ; y; y;  y)=YT
B0TZ(T ; d; d;  d)
Ft
!
B0tZ(t; d; d;  d)
= EQt
 bB0T=YT
B0T
Ft
!
B0tZ(t; d; d;  d) 
Z(T ; y; y;  y)
Z(T ; d; d;  d)
(A.4)
Eqn. (A.4) holds because the Z() functions are deterministic and can be moved
out of the expectation. Since T is an extremely long time, one can assume T to
be close to innity and write
Z(T ; y; y;  y) = exp

  y
y
 y

, Z(T ; d; d;  d) = exp

  d
d
 d

then Eqn. (A.4) becomesbBt
Yt
= EQt
 bB0T=YT
B0T
Ft
!
B0tZ(t; d; d;  d) exp

 d
d
 d  
 y
y
 y

(A.5)
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The price of the dollar value of the yen mma without the central banksimpact
is bB0t
Y 0t
= EQ
0
t
 bB0T=Y 0T
B0T
F 0t
!
B0t (A.6)
Dene the price impact as
bBt=YtbB0t=Y 0t = Y
0
t
Yt
Z(t; y; y;  y) (A.7)
From Eqn. (A.5) and (A.6),
bBt=YtbB0t=Y 0t =
EQt
 bB0T =YT
B0T
FtB0tZ(t; d; d;  d) expn dd  d    yy  yo
EQ
0
t
 bB0T =Y 0T
B0T
F 0tB0t (A.8)
Dene
e u(t)  EQt
 bB0T=YT
B0T
Ft
!
=EQ
0
t
 bB0T=Y 0T
B0T
F 0t
!
e u(t) represents the central banks impact on exchange rates through channels
other than a¤ecting interest rates.
From Eqn. (A.7) and (A.8), we derive the central banksimpact on exchange
rates:
Y 0t
Yt
=
Z(t; d; d;  d)
Z(t; y; y;  y)
exp

 d
d
 d  
 y
y
 y

e u(t)
where Yt (Y 0t ) is the spot exchange rate of yen per dollar with (without) the central
banksprice impact.
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